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ABSTRACT 
Jurgen Habem1as·s theory of an eroded public sphere is common to media studies 
that address the functions and shortfalls of news media in society. The theory 
tackles many aspects of society. but is most usually associated with the mass media 
and its role in facilitating infom1ed public debate among private persons coming 
together as a public to hold institutions of power to account. The term has been 
used to such a degree that its authority is taken as rote. which has subsequently 
reduced the complexity. subtleties and strength of Jurgen Habem1as·s original 
argwnents. In tum. this has caused critics to question the most fundamental aspects 
of the theory: is there just one sphere?: are the public merely acquiescent dupes of 
the mass media?; do the media really deliberately coerce and manipulate 
unsuspecting audiences? Habermas · s theory of an eroded public sphere is 
contentious and a target for criticism because in its simplistic form it appears 
conspiratorial and unlikely within a society with a free press and democratic 
institutions. Hmvever. this thesis argues that while there are certainly deliberate 
attempts at distorting public communications by influential actors. it is the 
prevailing conditions of communication that allow for such distortion. In this 
respect. Habermas·s theory deals with the structures and communicative networks 
within society and how these contribute to a depleted public sphere. 
In essence. the public sphere has been appropriated by autonomous organisations 
external to the public sphere. or the arena of common civil experience. These 
organisations seek legitimation by means of public acclamation attracted by 
manufactured publicity. However, public opinions that emerge from the public 
sphere and those that are formed from within private organisations, such as 
political parties and profit making corporations, are quite different. While there no 
doubt exists a spectrum of possible communicative interactions between private 
opinions and those that emerge from the public sphere, private organisations tend 
to treat the public as spectators and consumers. Like corporations who use tested 
marketing techniques such as opinion polling and surveys to distinguish markets, 
political parties and government use the same methods to sell policy or reputations 
in order to legitimate their power and influence over a voting public. The result is a 
. 
public sphere that is targeted by of various corporate or political opinions and 
agendas competing for public acclamation. The disparate information being 
channelled through the public sphere tends to cause mistrust between a public and 
2 
its political leaders. This is primarily because of a lack of consistency in the quality 
and veracity of information stemming from the fact that information does not often 
reflect or correlate with the lived experiences common to an electorate. By using 
news media accounts of the Australian 2004 federal election campaign. this study 
intends to demonstrate that Habermas's theory of an eroded public sphere is an 
effective way of casting a critical eye over nevvs media organisations and their 
interaction \Vith political po\ver and influence. 
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Introduction 
This study considers the news media's role in Australian society using Habermas's 
account of an eroded public sphere. The arguments that this thesis will be 
concerned \vith centre around Habermas's description, as outlined in The Structural 
Tramfiwmation <~( the Public Sphere (1989). of how increased journal and 
nev,spaper circulation, along with growing press freedoms from the early 
seventeenth century, allovved for public critical political debate. Newspapers 
informed a concerned readership of the relations between merchants. citizens, 
government representatives and all who felt they had a stake in the proceedings. 
That is, anyone \Vho wanted the chance to participate in civil society. Ideally. those 
who contributed to such public meetings in the coffee houses and salons of 
continental Europe and Britain during the eighteenth century were considered 
equals regardless of position or title and, therefore, had the means by which to hold 
government accountable. The emphasis that Habermas places on this arrangement 
is the equality of the pai1icipants and the condition that the strongest argument 
during ·rational-critical debate of a public into public opinion· (Habermas, 1989, p. 
219) would win. It was this guarantee of universal access, claims Habermas, w'hich 
would ensure current truths were bound to the logic of argument and counter-
argument (p. 219). As with most guarantees, however, it comes with a caveat, 
which is often confused with an oversight on Habermas·s part. That is, while free 
association and access to various arenas of public debate may be available to a 
public, privately organised bodies of influence and po\ver can potentially subvert 
opinions emerging from such arenas. Since the rise of advanced capitalism during 
the mid to late nineteenth century, Habermas claims that the public sphere has 
splintered into self-representing, hierarchical organisations with their own internal 
systems of autonomy. Important to Habermas's argument is that government, 
political parties and the news media have become publicly inaccessible 
organisations whose private agendas have become enmeshed and integrated with a 
once independent public sphere distinct from government. 
According to critics of Habermas's public sphere, the idea of universal access 
should be taken as an ideal rather than an all-encompassing view of a collective 
public within eighteenth century society. Ian Ward, for example, claims that 
Habermas's public sphere was inaccessible to the illiterate and women whose main 
role was considered to be tending to the home and caring for the family, otherwise 
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known as the ·private sphere· (Ward. 1997). Therefore. since the driving force 
behind the early public sphere was ·composed of bourgeois private persons 
crystallizing around newspapers and journals· (Habermas. 1996. p. 366) certain 
groups would be excluded from the circles of influence that provided a semblance 
of social cohesion of its own making. Peter Dahlgren claims that as an ideal 
concept. the public sphere ·retains an anchoring in critical theory. and to use the 
term incorporates the media within a critical perspective on democracy" (Dahlgren. 
1997. p. 9). That is. as a critical model used to realise the effectiveness of the news 
media as a two-way information relay between communities and political 
representatives. Habermas·s public sphere ·evokes wide-ranging critical reflection 
on social structure. the concentration of power. cultural practices. and the dynamics 
of the political process· ( p. 9). Nicholas Garnham ( cited in Reinecke. 1989. p. 14 7). 
too. sees the public sphere and the ·principles it embodies as an ideal type against 
which we canjudge existing social arrangements·. 
It does not appear. however. that Habermas is blind to these criticisms 111 his 
account of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere. Habermas adds that. although 
the public sphere was considered a space in which rational debate took place in a 
context of ·universal access' (Habermas. 1989. p. 219). this ideal was never truly 
realised. even during its most effective period. There are reasons. however. that 
Habermas persists with his argument of a degraded bourgeois public sphere. 
Today, as much as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. the possibility of 
inclusion for those outside the bourgeois public sphere always exists. However, 
what Habermas is saying specific to a mediatised public sphere, in both the 
Structural Transformation and his later work Between Facts and Norms (1996), is 
that the conception of a public sphere has always had its roots fixed firmly within a 
middle-class perspective. In addition, and contrary to criticisms that state 
otherwise, Habermas accepts that there exist other public spheres, of minority and 
interest groups, that can have an influence on civil society and its political function. 
However, since the bourgeois model of the public sphere, and all forms of culture 
that pass through it, have in themselves become commodities, there are fewer 
possibilities of less powerful actors, on the periphery of commodity exchange, 
being able to communicate effectively on a mainstream, or mass level. 
It is true, as critics have pointed out, that the conditions that allowed for the 
emergence of the bourgeois public sphere enabled the inclusion of minority groups. 
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This reflects wider arguments that continue today about the degradation of the 
public sphere through what are seen as lesser forms of mass popular culture and 
entertainment (Ivison. 2003. p. 33). Habennas does not take issue with these fom1s 
of culture as the main cause of the erosion of the public sphere. while still 
maintaining that they certainly play a role in exacerbating and sustaining its 
dysfunction. After all, Habennas acknowledges in his historical account of early 
eighteenth century Europe that it was the publisher taking over the role of the 
patron as the ·author's commissioner and [organizer ofl the commercial 
distribution of literary goods· (Habennas. 1989. p. 38) that led to a wider interested 
reading public. albeit the propertied and educated class. In turn. this led to the 
general public paying for the opportunity to attend theatres. museums and galleries 
previously reserved for the courts. Public discussion on these cultural activities was 
a natural part of this new environment. and it was this sequence of events that 
finally led to the bourgeois public sphere that not only discussed high culture, but 
also politics. The danger that arose, which is still prevalent today, is that powerful 
actors can, and do. appropriate the public sphere to further their own ends. It can be 
said of widespread mediated political debate, for example. that it has furthered the 
public's understanding of politics and potentially offers the possibility of inclusion. 
However, the reality is that political discourse is predominantly conducted between 
politicians, journalists. analysts and other specialised political commentators. In 
addition, the production of political discourse has been formalised. packaged and 
produced for consumption, by another set of specialists, that stifles a fluid, rational 
exchange of opinions emerging from other spheres of society. Deliberate or not, 
political communication in Australia can be controlled and steered by those with 
the means to do so, and accepted as a voice of normalised authority by those not 
willing to critically examine its motives or veracity. 
The political public sphere is all but closed to public participation, apart from the 
one democratic right offered to them on election day. Parliament Question time, the 
political arena where the public can supposedly view democracy at work via the 
news media, broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [ABC], 
becomes an arena where 'instruction-bound appointees meet to put their 
predetermined decisions on record' (Habermas, 1989, p. 205). Projected into the 
public sphere in this way, these privately produced policies and opinions seek to 
shape public opinion rather than inform and facilitate public debate between private 
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members of the electorate. Subsequently. say social researchers such as Hugh 
Mackay (McKay & Brown. 2004 ). the Australian electorate have become 
disengaged ,vith politics. If this is true. it is perhaps not because the public find 
politics boring. but because they have no meaningful part to play in the 
rationalising of decisions that may affect them. Alexis de Tocqueville observed. 
claims David lvison. that this chain of events has a constant reflexive effect on a 
public where the less politically inclusive a public perceives itself to be. the more 
apathetic to power they become (lvison. 2003. p. 31 ). 
There is also the additional factor that the news media are themselves privately 
owned organisations that are subject to: (a) government scrutiny: (b) the need to 
attract advertisers (in the case of commercial news media): and ( c) the need to 
harness a loyal audience and readership. These factors ,vhen combined cultivate an 
environment where participation and acknowledgement of the public is 
circumvented. and public debate reduced. With a greatly reduced role in political 
affairs. in effect an apolitical public sphere. Habermas·s argument is predominantly 
concerned with a public that is continually cast in the role of audience member 
rather than active participant. He describes this as the refeudalisation of the public 
sphere. where the public applaud power and authority the same way as they did 
before aristocracy. 
For a democracy to exist it needs an informed and politically engaged public. For 
an informed and politically engaged public to exist there needs to be a free, incisive 
and disinterested news media. The public sphere is now inhabited by the publicity 
and advertising of competing private interests used to influence public opinion in 
an effort to seek public acclamation on matters discussed privately. 
IO 
I. Criticism of Habermas 's Theory of an 
Eroded Public Sphere 
One way of describing Habennas· s theory of the public sphere in a clear manner is 
to highlight one or two opposing arguments and misleading representations. For 
example, Keith Windschuttle, Fixing the news ( 1981: 1988 and 2002), who has 
been involved in journalism, media theory and history for many years. stands as a 
critic of certain media and cultural theorists and their place in the Australian 
education system. More specifically. arguments expressed by Windschuttle at a 
keynote address at Queensland University of Technology, in 1998. and later 
published in Quadrant (1999) entitled ·Cultural Studies Versus Journalism'. and 
alternatively · Journalism Versus Cultural Studies· in Australian Studies .Journal 
( 1998). are somewhat representative of reoccurring criticisms levelled at 
Habennas·s theory of a degraded public sphere. By responding to a number of his 
and other critics it is hoped that a clearer understanding of what Habermas 1s 
attempting to achieve in his writings will emerge. 
In reference to Habennas' s theory of the media, Windschuttle asks why academic 
media theorists are still 'subjecting their students to such an intellectually and 
politically discredited theory, which sheds absolutely no light on the way the media 
operate?' (Windschuttle, 1998). In this particular case. Windschuttle' s approach is 
misleading, as he is discussing two separate issues. Windschuttle conflates the 
mechanics of journalism and with the societal representations that stem from such 
systems, and as such his argument confuses function \\,1th meaning. It is true that 
critics of the media may not have the benefit of having an insider's view of how a 
television or newspaper runs on a technical level, but they can, however, see the 
results of such processes. Critical theories of media and culture, such as 
Habermas's, offer a perspective on the way in which society is framed through, for 
example, hierarchies of race, gender, affluence and power, and why it is framed in 
that way and not another. It also highlights the deficiencies inherent in systems of 
the news media, where mediums such as television become arenas for ersatz public 
debate that favours staged displays by political actors over public contributions. 
Windschuttle's argument makes the assumption that if the journalistic mechanisms 
work, then its product must be as close to objectivity as can be expected. 
Windschuttle finds Habermas's theory improbable, perhaps thinking it unrealistic 
to believe that the news media deliberately 'exclude oppositional voices, [prevent] 
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rational debate, [have a] modus operandi [ of] concealment and subterfuge', 
consider their audience as ·either (a) mindless robots, or (b) fictional constructs that 
exist solely in discourse' (Windschuttle, 1998). As a result Windshuttle's 
vehement arguments miss Habermas's point entirely. 
Habermas argues that there is a relentless passage of infom1ation pouring through 
the channels of public communication from private organisations whose opinions 
and agendas do not emerge from the public sphere itself. Habermas explains that 
the public sphere is, or ideally should be, comprised of private individuals 
discussing and forming opinions on everyday experiences. For each individual 
person, it is the possibility of raising common concerns of everyday life experience 
that ensure active participation in the process of debate. In society, everyday 
experience often means how government decisions affect their lives directly, and 
therefore public opinions on government perfom1ance are fom1ed based on this 
discourse. Hence, public opinion emerging from virtual public spaces, the public 
sphere, in this way fom1s the foundation of an open society. 
However, Habermas discusses actors who exist autonomously outside the common 
spheres of public discourse. These groups may include political parties, 
corporations and government itself. who use their influence and power, both 
economic and political, to gain acclamation and consent from the public to 
legitimise and perpetuate their own existence and influence. In this environment of 
mass communication, the role of the news media can be one that questions 
government by facilitating public discourse on power, or they can act as a conduit 
for those power groups in their attempts at further self-legitimation. Of course, the 
news media are never exclusively 'either' a conduit or a critical eye on power; 
there are far more states that lie between these two extremes. It is this latter 
condition, however, that has contributed to the public sphere becoming eroded. 
That is, people are now finding it difficult to distinguish between disinterested 
public opinion and opinion aimed at acquiring their consent and ascension 
(Habermas, 1989 & 1996). 
In the media's expanded role from local community toward a more or less globally 
mediated society, sociologist John Thompson, argues that Habermas's approach is 
limited in its ability to truly understand the 'nature of public life' while: 
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wedded to a conception of publicness \Vhich is essentially 
spatial and dialogical in character, and which obliges us to 
interpret the ever-growing role of mediated communication as a 
fall from grace (Thompson. 1995. p. 132). 
Thompson is arguing that Habermas's theory relies too heavily on the conditions of 
commtmication encountered in a literal public space. of communities. 
Notwithstanding the fact that local and community based communications and 
discourse are an a priori to extended national and international discourse. 
Habermas responds to such criticisms of his theory of the public sphere in Bet,reen 
Facts and 1Vorms (1996). In this later work Habermas claims that the public sphere 
is not a static metaphorical reference to society: when Habem1as uses the term 
·Jifeworld", for example. he is referring to a global public sphere. where boundaries 
are constantly expanding. shrinking or splitting to accommodate social inclusion. 
While it is believed that it was Edmund Husserl that first used the term, the manner 
in which Habermas uses ·lifeworld' appears to carry on from Martin Heidegger·s 
interpretation. In Habermas's work. as Giovanna Borradori explains: 
The concept of world frees the public realm from the model of 
eighteenth century European society in relation to which the 
notion of a public sphere was first conceived (Borradori. 2003. p. 
65). 
This is true at all levels. from the public legitimation of the power elite to the 
integration of minority groups who, after exerting sufficient pressure on 
appropriate powers can influence, to varying degrees, the normative confines of a 
society's value system. 
Media theorists such as Tom Gitlin (in Liebes & Curran, 1998) and Duncan lvison 
(in Lurnby & Probyn, 2003) argue that Habermas does not make allowances for the 
integration of new technologies, such as the Internet, that allow for less powerful 
actors to have a significant influence on mainstream society. As a result of, and in 
addition to, this alleged oversight made by Habermas, other social spheres of 
influence, which Gitlin refers to as 'sphericules', created by lesser powers are 
ignored. Therefore, they claim, by excluding such possibilities Habermas' s 
conclusions rely exclusively on the specific communicative conditions that a 
singular public sphere generates. However, even in his earlier works Haberrnas 
presents us with a number of different spheres within, and external to, 'the' 
bourgeois public sphere: the episodic, such as taverns and coffee houses; and the 
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occasional, in the form of public presentations and events. Habermas's conceptions 
of various types of public spheres, and how he relates the developing forms of 
communication, contradict claims that his theory does not encompass multi spheres 
or allow for future forms of communication. He even talks of an abstract sphere, 
where consumers of mass media are brought together across vast geographical 
areas: 
The one text of "the" public sphere, a text continually 
extrapolated and extending radially in all directions, is divided 
by internal boundaries into arbitrarily small texts for which 
everything else is context; yet one can always build 
hermeneutical bridges from one text to the next (Habermas, 
1996, p. 374). 
Examples such as this demonstrate that the public sphere is neither a sphere nor 
that it is static and limiting in trying to determine the normative state of a society; 
characteristics and functions of the public sphere change in parallel to the way a 
society communicates and, therefore, is only as limited as society itself. Habermas 
is not viewing publicness 'through the lens of the traditional model' (Thompson, 
1995, p. 132) of communication, as Thompson states, but rather using previous 
models and forms of communication as a control state by which to measure 
succeeding ones, and the effect that they have on society. Habermas's model works 
on the basis of a continuing progression and comparison of communication models 
and publicity used to make some sense out of extremely complex human social 
networks. 
This is quite different from saying that news media organisations are against -
while there is a chance they might be - rational debate. Neither can it be said that 
arguments from commentators such as Habermas claim that these organisations' 
'modus operandi is concealment and subterfuge' (Windschuttle, 1998). Habermas's 
criticisms of news media organisations contends that it is the corporatised structure 
of these organisations, not an intentional 'modus operandi', which determines the 
prioritisation of certain stories, and story angles. In fact, throughout his work 
Habermas is arguing that, conditionally, any formalised organisational structures of 
communication tend to detract from informaL unstructured, interpersonal networks 
comprised of private citizens communicating and debating matters that affect them. 
In this way, it can be said that organisations set on creating publicity to legitimate 
their own existence or a consumer interest around a product to be sold, that is not 
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derived from citizens' own personal experiences within the 'lifeworld', and is 
primarily for the benefit of the organisation itself and citizens second - if at all -
does not constitute public opinion from the public sphere itself (Habermas, 1996, 
pp. 360 & 379). Under these conditions there is an allowance for organisations that 
do emerge from the public sphere and whose primary purpose is contributing 
toward citizens' and community needs more or less directly, or to allow a minority 
group to be recognised as a legitimate part of society where previously they were 
once discriminated against or seen as a threat to that society (p. 373). One example 
of a structural priority, however, is the need for commercial broadcast news 
organisation to stay commercially viable in a competitive market. In discussing 
television commercial news media, Fiske states that news is an expensive 
commodity that relies on advertisements, and therefore needs to be popular and 
produce an audience that will attract more advertisers (Fiske, 1991, p. 281). 
Windschuttle's argument that media theory assumes a passive unthinking audience 
of 'mindless robots' is also baseless. When Windschuttle presented this argument 
at the Queensland University of Technology in 1998, Habermas had already stated, 
in his text Between Facts and Norms (1996), that even though research on the 
effects of media on an audience remains controversial: 
The research on effect and reception has at least done away with 
the image of passive consumers as cultural dopes who are 
manipulated by the programs offered to them (Habermas, 1996, 
p. 377). 
Here is evidence that Habermas believes in an actively thinking, critical audience. 
Habermas's argument explains that the public sphere has become congested with 
competing commercial, government and a myriad of interest and lobby groups that 
interact with one another while simultaneously omitting the public. It is 
disingenuous for Windschuttle, and others who share his view, to argue that 
Habermas believes in the existence of a mindless or passive audience. These 
criticisms serve to highlight the very controversial nature of what Habermas is 
saying. That is, despite our existence within a democratic society where minority 
groups have the opportunity in which to make their case in pursuit of inclusion, the 
interests of those with power, wealth and social influence will most often prevail. 
These actors have a greater opportunity to distort the channels of communication, 
and as a result make the public sphere an ineffectual arena for public political 
debate. 
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Questions that George Soros. financier and philanthropist, raises over freedom of 
speech and democracy in American society points to \vhat seems a self-evident 
state of the ne\vs media, and the implications for democracy. Soros considers that, 
even though there is a free media in the United States, there is a \Vay for the ·facts' 
to be manipulated and distorted, but questions hmv it is ·possible to distort facts in 
an open society' (Soros. 2004). Habermas argues that the public sphere's function 
of allowing private citizens to critically debate publicly has been compromised by 
the competing interests of privately owned organisations. and opinion that is 
derived from publicity that displaces the pub] ic · s role in rational-critical debate. 
Critical debate is no longer public among organisations that have great influence on 
a public that has. in turn. a great dependency on some of these organisations. As a 
result the general public. the electorate. have lost their forum. and perhaps 
motivation, in which to come together as citizens. The corporatised model of 
society has. by default, relegated the pub] ic to the roles of audience, spectator and 
consumer. In his Struc:tural Tramformation of the Public Sphere ( 1989), Habermas 
refers to the public as a · great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but 
uncritical' (Habermas, 1989, p. 175). By this he means that society is divided into 
·suppliers' and ·consumers·, and given these conditions. public communication 
provides fewer opportunities for a public to be critical of power. The electorate are 
not dupes or robots but they are most likely frustrated with a media and political 
system that reduces their role as citizen to spectator of political events managed by 
organisations and interest groups outside of their sphere of influence. 
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2. The Appropriation of the Public Sphere 
2.1. The voter as spectator 
In the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), Habermas argues 
that at its heart the mass media is a culture of integration, and as a result has 
brought about the death of a public sphere independent of government self 
promotion and propaganda. By this he means that the public sphere, which should 
ideally be informed by a disinterested press, is no longer solely comprised of 
private individuals coming together as a public to debate and form opinions that 
inform the polity. Instead, government, private organisations and corporations are 
groups external to, and use their influence on, the public sphere in ways that attract 
publicity and legitimate their presence over their rivals. That is, an autonomous 
organisation's privately formed opinions are promoted publicly principally to 
accomplish public acclamation, rather than to enrich public debate. Today, as with 
most businesses, economic forces govern the news media, which means that they 
need to draw in a loyal and consistent audience base. To achieve this, the news 
media have a tendency to fuse and present political information in a stylised form, 
a narrative that blends both guidance and entertainment to attract public interest. As 
autonomous businesses in their own right, news media organisations are 
predominantly driven by a requirement for human interest (Habermas, 1989, p. 
175). The combination of political bodies and the news media seeking the 
acclamation of the public via staged publicity has resulted in events such as 
election campaigns making the public sphere an inadequate arena for public 
political debate. Habermas claims that the public sphere itself now assumes 
'advertising functions', where the more the public sphere 'can be deployed as a 
vehicle for political and economic propaganda, the more it becomes unpolitical as a 
whole and pseudo-privatised' (p. 175). During an election campaign, information, 
as political news media, has two aims. The first of these is the need of government 
and political parties to generate positive public interest in their policies and 
themselves. The other is the news media's own necessary objective in attracting 
audiences to their news programs (p. 178). In regard to a functioning public sphere, 
the twin objectives of these organisations are incompatible and inadequate if the 
intention is to engender informed political understanding derived from rational 
critical debate. 
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According to research conducted by the Australi911 Broadcasting Authority [ABA], 
on media audiences and where they source their news and current affairs 
information, a large proportion of Australians acquire their news media from 
traditional sources. The ABA's findings show that: 
Free to air television remains the most used source for news 
and current affairs with nearly 88 per cent of Australians 
using it followed by 76 per cent listening to the radio and 76 
per cent reading newspapers. National Nine News is the 
leader amongst free to air viewers (Australian 
Broadcasting Authority, 2000). 
It would therefore be a fair assumption to suggest that many Australians follow the 
progress of an election via these traditional news media sources. In this respect, the 
news media are burdened with a great responsibility as they decide how an election 
should be covered, and how the policies and the candidates responsible for them 
are represented to the public. Notwithstanding this responsibility, it would initially 
seem that the dissemination of political information could only lead to stronger 
public debate within the public sphere. Contrary to this assumption is Habermas's 
claim that public debate has actually suffered due to the development of private 
organisations and corporations' dominance in society. Habermas claims that the: 
public use of reason is shattered; the public is split apart into 
minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non 
publicly and the great mass of consumers whose 
receptiveness is public but uncritical (Habermas, 1989, p. 
175). 
This criticism would suggest that news media organisations run the risk of 
becoming little more than a conduit for political publicity and propaganda for the 
major party candidates involved. While not assuming that the news media directly 
and deliberately influence the public on political issues, it can be said that the news 
media and political parties interact and relegate the citizen to the role of spectator 
rather than political actor. 
Sociologist John Thompson argues that election campaigns are planned media 
events, where campaign coverage is a pre-planned, coordinated activity between 
the political participants and the news media intended to disrupt regular 
programmmg (Thompson, 1995, pp. 107-108). This implies that the voter is 
positioned as a spectator during an election campaign, rather than being a political 
18 
participant. From the very beginning of the six-week campaign, immediately after 
Prime Minister John Howard announced the election date on the 29 August 2004. 
the news media presented it as a spectacle. an event. On Perth ·s STW9 evening 
news. Nine Network's national political commentator Laurie Oakes (STW9 Nev,s. 
29 August 2004) sounded as though he was commentating a horse race: ·They're 
offl The PM fired the starters gun \Vhen he drove to Yarralumla to get approval 
from Governor Jeffery·. Accompanying Oakes·s commentary \Vas some fast-paced 
video editing displaying a white limousine driving through the Yarralumla gates. 
As the story swiftly unfolded. a sound bite from Prime Minister Hov,ard (STW9 
Ne\vs. 2004) made him sound like a boxer ready to enter the ring: ·Oh. yes! Tough 
fighf. The t\vo leaders were positioned as combatants even further when Oakes 
claimed that Labor had launched an 'all-out attack on Howard's credibility'. and 
that Mr Howard had ·met the challenge head on by declaring the election will be 
about trust'. The juggernaut of video footage continued. and additional grabs of 
John Howard asking 'who do you trust?' were juxtaposed with Mark Latham 
claiming that the present 'government had been dishonest for too long·. j\/ine 's 
story ended by questioning the credibility and worthiness of either leader. Oakes 
claimed that Latham· s campaign agenda \Vas a 'rehash· of an earlier speech that he 
had given nearly a year before, and that John Howard was yet to face 'further 
embarrassment' in the Senate over the children overboard affair. 
In this brief, fast-paced story, Nine Neirs focused on the physical accoutrements 
and symbols of power, politics and the personas of the leaders themselves, with the 
leaders positioned as competitors in a manner usually reserved for sports men and 
women. This highlights a news media predominantly concerned with characters 
and personalities in politics, rather than in promoting public discourse. Habermas 
even refers to this kind of treatment of democracy as the 'refeudalisation' of the 
public sphere, observing that: 'the "suppliers" display a showy pomp before 
customers ready to follow' (Habermas, 1989, p. 195). As a result, Channel Nine's 
coverage of the first day of the election campaign looked more like an opening 
ceremony for a sporting event than the commencement of an election. The term 
'suppliers' can be taken to mean both the news media and politicians, who equally 
share a vested interest in cultivating a culture of information consumption, not 
formation, among the electorate. In this way, the process of informing the public on 
political matters is disseminated in a top down manner (p. 177) from government, 
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political parties and interest groups, via the opinions and analysis of political 
journalists, experts and commentators. 
While news media is produced in a style that is considered entertaining in order to 
attract the attention of the electorate, there are arguments that claim that this has 
little to offer viewers in the way of political information. Graeme Turner observes 
that television news and current affairs programs, especially political debates, are 
regarded as too boring for audiences to watch. As a result only the most high 
profile political issues succeed in being broadcast on television. 'Political analysis 
on television limps along in 30-second grabs on national news reports, or in poorly 
resourced interviews on the 7.30 Report or Lateline' (Turner, 2003, p. 144). Even a 
cursory glance at news and current affairs content reflects these observations. 
During the first weeks of the election campaign, the story order on local Perth 
commercial news stations had either the Beslan school siege, or progress reports on 
a cyclone threatening the Florida coast, as the lead stories. 
Local news content profiled highly, such as on 5 September, 2004 when, following 
the lead Beslan siege story, Perth's STW9 news reported a four car 'head on' 
collision occurring on a road between Mandurah and Bunbury. This observation 
correlates with a 1995 study (cited in Firth, 1999, p. 63) of Sydney's Channel 
Seven, where it was shown that Seven's editors kept news 'simple and local' in 
fear of losing their audience, and that 'foreign news on free-to-air commercial 
television is brief, dramatic and entertaining rather than searching or analytical'. 
This is because most foreign policy issues are deemed 'too complicated to lend 
themselves to popular media treatment' (p.63). Election coverage was always in the 
second half of the half hour news program, and was comprised mainly of brief 
'grabs' of the key political players, opposition leader Mark Latham, Prime Minister 
John Howard and Senator Bob Brown. In contrast, The ABC usually covered the 
progress of the election campaign first, and in slightly more detail, except during 
and after the Beslan school siege. The ABC used very similar footage, or grabs, as 
the commercial stations. If there was a major development that included extended 
visuals of the leaders on the campaign trail, or there was a political scandal, this 
would usually make the headlines on the commercial stations. This pattern was 
repeated throughout the election campaign. 
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Kevin McQuillan considers that the similarities between footage and stories used 
are a waste of resources. McQuillan claims that the findings of his report 
(Appendix: A), commissioned by Chris Anderson, a former Chief Executive of 
Optus and current board member of Publishing and Broadcasting Limited (PBL), 
support a move for the pooling of resources between news media organisations. 
McQuillan claims that in the United States resource-sharing between networks: 
happens on a daily basis in Washington, where each network 
in a pool will take responsibility for covering the White 
House, providing the crew, reporter and uplink on White 
House press conferences (McQuillan, 2004). 
Participants in a focus group that Michael Pusey conducted for his book The 
£,:,:perience ol Middle Australia: The Dark Side ol Economic Refhrm (2003 ), have 
already expressed general anxieties and mistrust of the 'sensationalism', 'bias' and 
the 'Americanisation' of the media (Pusey, 2003, p. 136), where the '[p]olitical 
dialogue in the United States has degenerated into a welter of rhetorical flourishes 
and abstract platitudes' (Boggs, 2000, p. 47). Further moves to consolidate the 
relationships between news media organisations would surely only exacerbate 
public perceptions of sensationalism even fmiher. Regardless of Anderson's 
motives in commissioning such a study, the approach seems to miss the point of the 
much broader problem of all news media organisations gravitating toward, as 
Turner argues, the most high profile political issues. It is a problem because often 
the most high profile political story is not the most publicly relevant, and is sought 
after by media organisations because of the publicity surrounding it rather than its 
substance and significance. 
In discussing the libertarian and social responsibility models of journalism. Sally 
White claims that the news media's role in the 'democratic process is ultimately 
more important than its economic function and individual media organisations can 
be exempt from having to earn their way in the market place· (White, 1991. p. 9). 
The way in which journalism has been infused with other types of mediatised 
information has weakened the idea of the liberal model, and weakened journalism. 
The speed, volume and corifiguration of mass media content favour those who 
distribute rather than the consumers who receive the information (Borradori, 2003, 
p.57), and the cacophony of news, entertainment and advertising 'comes together 
to form a syndrome that works to depoliticise public communication' (Habermas, 
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1996, p. 3 77). Freelance journalist John Pilger claims that the term journalism has 
had a shift in meaning, and believes that the distinction that we now have between 
journalism and 'investigative journalism' is misleading. That is, all journalism 
should be considered investigative. Most importantly, 'investigative' journalism 
'refuses to accept the press release version of events. It looks behind facades. It is 
always sceptical of authority, of vested interest, of governments (Pilger, 2004). It is 
the 'different conditions of communication', claims Habermas (Habermas, 1996, 
pp. 366-367), that determine how information is channelled and regulated between 
the private and public spheres, and how permeable each is to the other. Without 
communication channels available to the public that they can feel confident will 
provide the possibility for actual political participation, politics becomes 
impoverished, and people lose interest. 
Prior to the election, social researcher Hugh MacKay's qualitative research was 
showing that the electorate's desire, or inclination, to play an active role in politics 
had declined. Early in April, on both the ABC's 7.30 Report (Latharn's popularity 
plunges, 2004) and Channel Ten's political program Meet the Press (McKay & 
Brown, 2004 ), MacKay stated that recent political developments in Australia have 
been taking place 'in the context of a pretty disengaged electorate, people who are 
not riveted by these issues'. On the 7. 3 0 Report, MacKay (Latham's popularity 
plunges, 2004) claimed that nothing '[Opposition leader] Mark Latham has said 
has really had any impact on the fundamental drivers that are going to determine 
the outcome of the next election - which are the economy and this whole bogey of 
national security'. On Meet the Press, MacKay (McKay & Brown, 2004) stated 
that 'this is not an electorate engaged with politics. I find it still quite hard to get 
people to say anything about federal politics'. MacKay's remarks reflect past 
international comparative studies of television viewing in trilateral nations. In these 
countries, 'including Australia, heavy TV use is associated with lower civic 
involvement and less interest in discussing politics' (Pusey, 2003, p. 128). In 
connection to these findings. an additional disincentive may be that with the 
prevalence of so many political commentators available, such as Paul Kelly, Paul 
Bongiorno, Laurie Oakes, Kerry O'Brien, Tony Jones, Maxine McKew and 
Michael Brissenden to name but a few, perhaps people no longer believe that 
politics is within their grasp, possibly feeling too intimidated to talk about a topic 
on which they believe they have no knowledge. Or the prevalence of such political 
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'experts' somehow relinquishes political participation from an alienated public. Or 
put another way, their existence can have the added effect of relieving the public 
from using or relying on their own critical abilities on political matters. 
The divide between sender and receiver demonstrates what Habermas (1989, pp. 
216-217) refers to as a 'periodically manufactured public sphere' in which the 
news media operate as an advertising vehicle for political parties. As private 
autonomous organisations in their own right, both the news media and political 
parties: 
develop their own internal systemic logics and push the 
citizen into the peripheral role of mere organization member. 
They explode the model of a polity that determines itself 
through the shared practice of the citizens themselves 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 505). 
However, an audience watching, reading or listening to news media coverage may 
get the impression that the journalists and production team consider themselves 
independent of the political display, rather than being an integral part of its 
construction. Media analyst Rodney Tiffen, for example, argues that the news 
media like to portray the image that 'they are reporting a campaign which exists 
independently of them' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 127). It is an attitude that contributes 
further to the construction of a manufactured public sphere, as neither are 
independent of one another, and each relies heavily upon the other for success in 
the lead up to, and during, an election campaign. To some commentators this 
relationship is a false, misleading and redundant one. For example, Rodney 
Cavalier ( cited in Bean, Simms, Bennett & Warhurst, 1997, p.31 ), an ALP 
campaigner and government MP since the 1960s, states that: 'the great mistake of 
campaign reportage is that it treats an election as an event worthy of narrative. An 
election is a process largely invisible' [italics added]. However, Cavalier's 
statement is axiomatic as it is precisely because elections, and political processes in 
general, are now so 'invisible' that a constructed narrative of events has become a 
necessary element in any news media coverage of an election campaign. Why they 
have become invisible to the public will be discussed in the next two sections on 
political debates and public opinion. 
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2.2. Mediated political debates 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm explains that politicians' reluctance to speak their mind 
in public can be attributed to the rise of mass political parties, mass media, and a 
subsequent widespread democratic fervour that these developments caused. The 
developing politics of mass propaganda and mass media posed a new set of 
problems for politicians and, along with the rise of democratic libertarian notions 
of the press. politicians and ruling classes found it prudent to avoid being drawn 
into discussions on democracy and the implications for the power elite that it may 
bring. With every word being carried by reporters to households everywhere, 
politicians found it increasingly advantageous to avoid saying what they actually 
' 
meant (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 87-88). As a consequence, claims Hobsbamn, 'what 
intelligent observer could overlook the yawning gap between public discourse and 
political reality (p. 88). Regardless of these observations, we still tend to, have to, 
rely on individuals in the news media to gamer useful information from politicians 
and authority figures. Tiffen claims that the news media are 'the central forum of 
political communication' and, therefore, also a 'key arena of political conflict' 
(Tiffen, 1989, p. 5). As far as democratic debate is concerned, however, the 
·conflict' is publicly staged and broadcast. and represents public opinion only in a 
very narrow way. 
Habermas claims that mediated political debates and interviews have become 
commodities. Where debate and political forums were once based on critical 
reviews of cultural production, discussion itself is now a consumer item. 
Habermas, while accepting that the commercialisation of cultural goods is one way 
in which to cultivate rational-critical debate. observes that debate itself should be 
·excluded from the exchange relationships of the market' (Habermas, 1989. p. 
164). For Habermas, commercially produced cultural and political debates indicate 
a shift away from private people debating political matters as a public of equals, as 
·human beings' (p. 164). That is, we may tend to have more of an opinion on what 
politicians and experts being interviewed have to say, rather than our own opinions 
that evolve from everyday experiences. This is also true in regard to the topics to 
be raised. In discussing the relationship between politicians and the press gallery, 
Don Watson observes that: 'The media determine the form and, very often, the 
subject of debate' (Watson, 2002, p. 51). One may assume that this would have the 
desired effect of holding politicians to account, but as anyone who has seen a 
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politician being interviewed would know. this is not so. The way in which a 
political intervie\v or debate is structured, following fonnalised rules. etiquette and 
presentation (Habennas. 1989, p. 164). in addition to the adherence to time 
constraints and the strict question-and-answer system. does not often foster quality 
debate (Beresford, 1997, pp. 58-60). 
This was cetiainly true of the centrepiece debate that the ne\VS media built up to 
during the campaign. The ·Great Debate·. as it is called, \Vas televised live on the 
Nine Network's 60 kfinutes, which 2001 host, Ray Mmiin. referred to as 'the 
national broadcaster·. Before the commencement of the 2004 ·Great Debate·, the 
host, Charles Wooley (Great Debate. 2004), described Nine·s live coverage of the 
Great Debate as the only occasion when the two leaders meet for a 'face-to-face 
encounter·. While this may perhaps be considered a coup for the Nine Network. it 
is a poor reflection of our political and news media systems. This means that on 
only one occasion do the public get to see each leader's ideas and opinions being 
tested by their political opponent, let alone being tested by other party leaders or, 
for that matter, a live audience. In place of audience questions the same old 
political experts, and senior journalists are left to ask the difficult questions. The 
panel was comprised of: Malcolm Farr from the Daily Telegraph; Neil Mitchell 
from Radio 3A W in Melbourne; Michelle Grattan from the Age and the ABC's 
chief political correspondent, Jim Middleton, with Laurie Oakes acting as 
moderator. In contrast, the public are again removed from political participation, 
such as directing questions to the party leaders on live television, and are instead 
relegated to providing statistical information via the 'worm'. 
The worm is a box with a dial that can be used by a member of a live audience 
watching the debate to respond by turning a dial left or right in accordance with 
how well they think a politician is responding to a question. A graph is produced 
from the collated results that represents the performance of the politicians during 
the debate. However, as has already been discussed, we are never really sure as to 
why the audience liked or disliked what is being said. They may not have liked 
John Howard's tie for all we know. Furthermore, without questions from the public 
the debate may have missed the opportunity for topics such as indigenous affairs 
and the environment, which were not covered in the debate. Featuring heavily were 
the areas of national security, health, the economy and workplace relations, and the 
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panel obliged by staying with these themes. While this media event between the 
two leaders may enlighten some viewers to campaign issues, the leaders rarely 
strayed from their campaign messages, and offered little in the way of new 
information. 
The task, then, 1s for the interviewer, through comprehensive and incisive 
questioning, to try and expose irregularities in any policy, not just the face value 
benefits advocated by the politician. Despite the best efforts of an interviewer, 
however, political interviews rarely achieve any new insight outside the policy's 
initial media release. Speaking from his experience as a political interviewer for 
the ABC's 7.30 Report, Kerry O'Brien (cited in Irving, 2004) recalls one technique 
politicians use to get a political message across during what is supposed to be an 
interview. The technique involves drawing: 
breath mid sentence, rather than at the end of a sentence, so 
that they can charge on with their answer and not give you a 
gap to get your next question in. 
In using 'tricks of the trade' such as this, a politician can control an interview; they 
can simultaneously eat into the interviewer's valuable question time while 
favourably promoting a policy, their own party, or themselves. Early in the 
election campaign, Lateline 's Tony Jones queried the Prime Minister (cited in 'PM 
defends', 2004) about a promise that he made, while in opposition in 1995, to the 
electorate. In 1995 Howard proclaimed that: 'I can promise you we will follow 
policies which will, over a period of time, bring down the foreign debt'. At that 
time the trade deficit was $194 billion. According to Jones, since John Howard's 
government came to power this figure has risen to $393 billion. Jones (PM 
defends, 2004) asked Howard: 'Now why didn't you keep that key economic 
promise?' Jones rephrased this question in numerous ways during the interview, 
but John Howard chose not to address the question directly and instead supplied 
answers that linked interest rates to Labor's economic record. The following quote 
is representative of the type of response Howard supplied throughout the course of 
the interview: 
out there where people have high mortgages, they are 
sensitive to interest rate movements and they will look at the 
record of my Government over the last eight-and-a-half 
years, they will remember the 17 per cent interest rates of 
Paul Keating and Bob Hawke (PM defends, 2004). 
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John Howard used the time available to follow the Liberal-Coalition campaign 
strategy, which was attacking the economic credibility of the Labor party while 
advertising the government's own economic management team of Howard and 
Costello. While Howard was given the opportunity on ABC's Lateline to explain 
to the public why the trade deficit is so high, and how his government was going to 
remedy it, he decided to remain evasive. 
British studies of the political interview further confirm that politicians and the 
news media are not necessarily a politically informative mix, and merely give the 
impression of in-depth debate. According to Peter Bull, there are a number of 
identifiable characteristic features associated with the political interview: 'the 
distinctive pattern of tum taking, the high frequency of interruptions and 
equivocation, and the importance of face management and self-presentation', 
where a 'politician's skills in face management in interviews becomes of central 
importance' (Bull, 1998, p. 158). The study conducted by Bull and Mayer revealed 
that politicians provide substantially less direct replies, a difference on average of 
40%, to questions compared with non-political interviewees (p. 152). Another 
study conducted by Bavelas demonstrated how a politician's 'communicative 
situation' predicted an equivocation as a result of the question being impossible to 
answer without damaging either their own party, another party affiliate, or a 
segment of the public. This was referred to as an 'avoidance-avoidance' scenario. 
In this situation it is the potential mistakes that a politician can make that may win 
or lose support from an electorate or significant other (p. 153). These 'aggressive' 
interview tactics, generally speaking, are more likely to be seen on shows such as 
the ABC's Lateline, and 7.30 Report. However, as already noted, this approach in 
itself does not guarantee a successful interview if the interviewee remains 
obstructive and chooses not to participate. 
Comparatively, a third study revealed that not all questions are as adversely 
deterministic, and can in fact have a favourable result for the politician. This type 
of question, unlike the awkward Bavelas questions, can be answered with what is 
called a 'non-necessary threat' response where politicians can make positive 
statements about himself or herself and the party that the politician represents. Of 
course, it also allows for the discrediting of opponents (p. 156). Predictably, the 
majority of politicians analysed chose to give 'non-necessary threat' responses to 
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such questions (p. 156). Tiff en states that in relation to policy 'there are more costs 
than benefits in being specific.' Where 'the extra detail may provide a target for 
opponents to attack, and increase the likelihood of a gaffe' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 140). 
What most people who do not watch current affairs see, however, is the doorstop 
interview during the nightly news that relies on the 'sound bite'. The doorstop 
interview is when a politician is seen getting out of a car, or entering/leaving a 
location, a scenario that allows them freedom to say what they like and avoid 
difficult questions. 'The advantage of using sound bites, particularly for 
commercial news channels, is their brevity and entertainment value' (Payne, 1999, 
p. 100). Dr Trish Payne, a lecturer in communication studies, highlights the varying 
approaches and attitudes toward journalistic standards when she quotes Agnes 
Warren, of the ABC's Media Report, who claims that politicians take advantage of 
the brevity of commercial media, while appearing to sound as though they are 
giving both sides of a complex argument. 
If the public have in fact become despondent about mediated politics, a response to 
this, claims Brian McNair, may be an 'aggressive, adversarial journalism, in the 
form of tough interviewing techniques ... as they constitute visible displays of the 
vulnerability and accessibility of political elites' (McNair, 2002, p. 201). There are 
sometimes occasions when the interviewer does manage to crack the political 
surface, and some vulnerability shows through. According to Stuart Firth, 
'governments worry about the media because the media influences public opinion', 
but 'mass public opinion about much of Australia's foreign policy hardly exists' 
(Firth, 1999, p. 65). Government controls the agenda on foreign policy, and it 
would be a fair assumption to say they would like to keep it that way (p. 65). So, 
when the news media attain some piece of significant material that may jeopardises 
public support for the Iraq war, for example, the government attempts to neutralise 
and discredit the story. 
While interviewing the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, Lateline 's Tony 
Jones was attempting to gain more information about the Australian Defence 
Force's (ADF) involvement, if any, in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses. Jones 
already had some background information that linked an ADF legal officer, Major 
O'Kane, to the drafting of a letter to the Red Cross in December. Jones asked 
Downer whether it 'disturbed' him that the letter stated that for 'security reasons 
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some internees at Abu Ghraib would not be given the protection of the Geneva 
Conventions?' (Downer plays down, 2004). On this particular night Downer was 
on the defensive, as the O'Kane revelations had become headline news among 
nearly all the news organisations. Downer claimed he had not seen the letter, and 
that this was a desperate attempt to involve Australians in the prisoner abuse 
scandal. Downer, indignant, argued that: 'to suggest that an Australian was 
involved in the drafting or a partial drafting of some letter'. At this point, mid-
sentence. however, Downer changes tact before continuing with: 'the person who 
signed the letter is the person who's responsible for the letter'. However, Jones 
challenged Downer about what he knew, asking whether he was disputing that an 
Australian had helped draft the letter or not. During the course of the interview 
Downer claimed that the ABC and the Labor party had colluded to make an 
argument 'that somehow there was an Australian involvement in these Abu Ghraib 
atrocities' (Downer plays down, 2004). He also accused Jones of 'impugning the 
integrity' of ADF officers, when Jones was actually trying to show that there was a 
collapse in communication between Foreign Affairs. the Defence Department and 
officers in Iraq. Furthermore, Downer referred to the idea of prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib not having the protection of the Geneva Convention as 'some legal 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions' (Downer plays down, 2004). 
When Jones asked Downer why O'Kane was not permitted to give evidence before 
a Senate Estimates Committee on matters relating to Abu Ghraib, Downer again 
aligned the ABC with the Labor Party, claiming that: 'this is the line the Labor 
Party run' (Downer plays down, 2004). Downer tried yet another tack by asking 
Jones the questions and what he thought Senate Estimates Committee hearings 
were for. Answering his own question, Downer said: 
They are supposed to be about the financial estimates of 
government departments. . .. You've got Senator Faulkner 
going in the Senate Estimates abusing public servants, 
humiliating public servants and then demanding people 
come before a Senate committee (Downer plays down. 
2004). 
However, on the government's own parliamentary website it clearly states that: 
One of the most significant features of the procedure for 
examining estimates is the opportunity that senators have to 
question officers of the public service directly . . . The 
provision of facts and figures is a necessary but not 
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sufficient condition of accountability. What is needed to 
complete the picture is for the relevant officials to explain, 
not only the details of the 'what' and the 'how', but also the 
'why' of departmental administration (Senate's Legislation 
Committees, 200 I). 
Furthermore, any evidence tabled in an estimates enquiry cannot be done so m 
secret, and all documents given in evidence become public (2001 ), which could be 
problematic for a government attempting to silence debate on a controversial topic. 
Foreign Minister Downer's performance on Lateline demonstrates how politicians, 
faced with a difficult series of questions, attempt to avoid responsibility or 
ownership of a negative issue being addressed by the interviewer. The technique is 
used to shut down debate, that is, give the impression of debate while trying not to 
reveal crucial information that can hold government to account. As McNair 
suggests, however, an adept and prepared interviewer can on occasion at least 
reveal some vulnerabilities. 
2.3. Public Opinion 
During the early stages of the six-week campaign, the 7.30 Report's Kerry O'Brien 
stated that, tongue in cheek, 'at this stage [of the campaign] we are not quite sure 
who is listening'. It may be that the electorate were not interested in the policy 
issues, but it is the business of political parties and government to at least have 
some idea of who is listening to them. Commercial media organisations, for 
example, need to know their audience and what will draw and hold their attention 
long enough for advertisers to take advantage of audience attentiveness 
(Cunningham & Turner, 2002, p. 87). To effectively target a specific audience, 
consumer group or an electorate, political parties and news media organisations 
measure the public attitudes via opinion polls and surveys. The rationale behind 
their use is that it makes public opinion more or less predictable, and subsequently 
taking some of the guesswork out of policy decisions (Mills, 1986, p. 43). Polling 
may inform, for example, how a government minister should behave and respond 
during media interviews. Michel Foucault's writings on discipline incorporate the 
scientific study of populations as a means by which governments can control 
population. Knowing detailed movements and characteristics of populations, for 
example, led to the recognition of the conjugal family as an economic unit that 
could be incorporated into the state. 
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Foucault, (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 270) observes that 'discipline was never more 
important or more valorised than at the moment when it become [sic] important to 
manage a population'. The use of opinion polls is the positivist contrast to 
Habermas's definition of open and civil society that itself legitimates 
representatives of power through informed public debate (Habermas, 1989, p. 
236). Habermas believes that because public opinion should be derived from 
rational-critical debate as 'public opinion is not representative in the statistical 
sense. It is not an aggregate of individually gathered, privately expressed opinions 
held by isolated persons' (Habermas, 1996, p. 362). Armed with polling results 
that define a population's demography, advertising and public relations agencies 
may embark on a campaign to promote a product that not only 'solidifies the 
profile of the brand and a clientele of consumers but mobilizes for the firm or 
branch or for an entire system a quasi-political credit' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194). 
Neil Postman argues that many of these polls and surveys use push polling 
anyway, where the answer already lies in the question, that is 'the public's opinion 
on almost any issue will be the function of the question asked' (Postman, 1993, p. 
134 ). When political parties and government use the same methods as corporations 
to attract publicity, Australia's entire political system and political functions are 
corrupted. A government that seeks public acclamation derived from private or 
undebated opinion is embarking on a process of public control rather than allowing 
a society to determine itself by the will of the people. 
Neil Postman states that: 
The question is as yet undecided whether knowledge of voter 
trends during a political campaign enriches or demeans the 
electoral process. But when polls are used to guide public 
policy, we have a different sort of issue altogether' 
(Postman, 1993, pp. 132-133). 
An opinion is not a static object that can be measured, 'it is a process of thinking' 
(p. 134). When political parties and news media organisations use techniques that 
bypass rational discourse, they become both the creators and purveyors of their 
own news and policy. Turner claims that there was some consternation when the 
'Australian began commissioning its Newspoll surveys and then publishing its 
interpretations of the results as front-page stories' (Turner, 1996, p. 44). The front-
page headline of The West Australian on election day, for example, read: 'AND 
THE WINNER IS HOWARD, SAY POLLS' (Dodson & Taylor, 2004, p. 1). The 
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headline was based on the latest ACNielsen poll. Under the bold headline, there is 
a large picture of Latham and Howard locked in a long and awkward handshake. 
As they passed each other in a radio station corridor, Latham vigorously grasped 
the Prime Minister's hand and closing in quickly hovered over him in what looked 
like deliberate intimidation. Anyone who watched any television news during the 
campaign would have seen this confrontation repeated ad infinitum. The West 
Australian ·s headline positions the reader to view Howard as a rational, humble 
bloke, over the irrational, bullying Mark Latham. Together, the photograph and the 
ACNielsen poll, as Turner rightly points out, is 'creating news, not reporting it' (p. 
44). The use of polls is a good way for the news media to generate a story that may 
otherwise not have existed. Consequently, analysis and speculative commentary on 
polls and the competition between leaders that it generates, feeds · ... into the 
general picture reinforcing their images as winners and losers' (Ti ffen, 1989. p. 
144). 
The integration of disparate information and marketing techniques used by 
corporations and political parties contributes to the distortion of public 
communications that further depoliticises the public sphere. For example, just prior 
to the election in 1996, Four Corners reporter Liz Jackson asked Prime Minister 
Howard: 'when did you change your view that Medicare was a total disaster? 
When did you change your view that bulk billing was a rort' (Jackson, 1996). 
Howard responded by claiming that the 'Australian people like Medicare and they 
want to keep it'. Howard continued by saying that • anybody who has the same 
view year in and year out, irrespective of the expression of public opinion, is 
stupid' (Jackson. 1996). Since coming to power John Howard has attempted to 
associate his party with the traditional Labor Party policy area of health. 
Strategically speaking, one would imagine that in a tightly contested two party 
race, this was in effort to neutralise any political advantage the Labor Party may 
gain from the association between health and the ALP. In this sense. the 
relationship between the two parties closely resembles the rivalry between two 
corporations fighting over market share. 
Nicholas Ind, a corporate brand theorist, cites research, conducted by the Opinion 
Research Corporation [ORC], that 'demonstrates the importance of an 
organisation's reputation and the management of that reputation' (Ind, 1997, p. 
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57). One of the main statements posed by ORC that most executives agreed upon 
was that: 
when several companies' products or services are similar in 
quality or price, the companies' respective corporate 
reputation often determines which service the customer will 
buy (p. 57). 
Since his election in 1996, John Howard and his ministers have been claiming that 
the Liberal Party is more of a friend of Medicare than the Labor Party. Former 
Health Minister Michael Wooldridge (Medicare Stronger than Ever, 2000), Health 
Minister Tony Abbott (Abbott, Gillard battle, 2004), and the Prime Minister have 
at every opportunity have expressed the claim that the Liberal-Coalition party are 
'better friends of Medicare than the Labor Party' (Medicare Announcement, 2004). 
In a tight contest between two parties selling the same product, 'repetition and 
visibility are the only true measures of success' (Klein, 2001, p. 49). 
Habermas argues that conducting non-public opinion polling of the electorate 
results in 'issue related arguments' and 'political program statements' becoming 
symbols and representations (Habermas, 1989, pp. 217-218). Therefore, rather than 
fluid and fluctuating opinions on political issues in the form of national debates, 
internal polling congeals a non-public opinion to be used strategically by a party. 
Therefore, an advertisement (Appendix: B) extolling the virtues of the 
government's added benefits to Medicare, such as the 'safety net', served to 
associate the green and gold Medicare logo more with the government than the 
Opposition. The Medicare commercials were promoted by the government public 
service announcements rather than advertisements, though currently it is apparently 
a moot point as to what constitutes an advertisement or public service 
announcement. While accepting that both parties have spent excessive amounts of 
public money on advertising, the ABC's Media Watch (Aren't there any rules?, 
2004) claim that Howard's Medicare advertisements are broadcast in spite of 
recommendations made in 2000, by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts & 
Audit, that recommends a ban on the 'dissemination of material to the public which 
promotes activities, programs or initiatives of the government in a politically 
partisan or biased manner'. A later government report into the conduct of the 2001 
Federal Election shows a regression on the issue of government advertising. The 
report reveals that: 
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there are significant difficulties both in defining what 
constitutes government advertising for political purposes, and 
in determining appropriate regulation and enforcement 
mechanisms (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 
2001, p. xxxvi). 
Putting a positive spin on Howard's behaviour would mean accepting that the use 
of polls is the process of using science in trying to make democracy rational, with 
better governance over the population the intended result. However, this would 
ignore the recent coverage of 'Prime Minister John Howard [ apologising] for 
raising the safety net thresholds by hundreds of dollars', despite Tony Abbott's 
"'iron-clad" guarantee, ... made during the election, that the threshold would stay 
the same' (Abbott knew of safety net, 2005). In light of this, John Howard could be 
accused of using opinion polls and marketing strategies to secure his own 
popularity and power. 
In another example, The Australian Financial Review's [AFR] David Bassanese 
believed that internal government polling had recognised a stark reality faced by 
'Australian Households', that 'they're way over their heads in debt and acutely 
sensitive to the fear that their interest bill might rise further' (Bassanese, 2004, p. 
21 ). The Coalition's recognition of this circumstance in connection with the 
government's election strategy would suggest attempts by the government at 
playing on the fears and vulnerabilities of a substantial proportion of indebted 
families. The following paragraph of rhetorical questions is what constituted John 
Howard's' election campaign, and he and his team adhered to it religiously 
throughout the campaign: 
Who do you trust to keep the economy strong? Who do you 
trust to keep interest rates low? Who do you trust to lead the 
fight on Australia's behalf against international terrorism? 
Who do you trust to keep the budget strong? The election will 
be about the future of this nation over the next ten years 
(Choice of October 9, 2004). 
Howard's own strategy was to campaign heavily on the symbols of national 
security and the economy. Translating one Foucault's College de France lecture, 
Colin Gordon (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 270) argues that Foucault treats security 'as 
a specific principle of political method and practice', and as such, 'we live today 
not so much in a Rechsstaat or disciplinary society as in a society of security'. 
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Furthermore, security can be linked with any other number of 'governmental 
configurations', such as welfare, defence, immigration, science and economics (pp. 
270-273). Consequently, Prime Minister Howard announced that the election was a 
referendum on which party could be better 'trusted' to deliver 'strength and 
stability' in relation to the vast national security and economic challenges that 
needed to be faced. 
For example, on September 9, 2004 there was a terrorist attack on the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta, with those responsible claiming to be members of the 
organisation called Jemaah Islamiah [JI]. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 
during a press conference in Jakarta, claimed that the bombing was directed at the 
Australian embassy, but that there was no evidence to support any claims that the 
bombing was designed to influence the Indonesian or Australian election results, as 
it did in Madrid (Downer, 2004). Both Latham and Howard were quick to condemn 
the terror attacks and to pay their respects to those that had died or been injured. 
The press and news broadcasters used the situation to devote large portions of 
newspaper space or broadcast time to dwell on 'our' casualties. Articulating public 
sentiment symbolically or pictorially towards political issues is one of the key 
mechanisms that the media and political parties use. Stuart Ewen, a media theorist, 
states that symbols have the capacity 'to magnify emotion while undermining 
critical thought, to emphasise sensations while subverting ideas' (Ewen, 1996, p. 
157). In Walter Lippmann's ( cited on p. 157) words, 'in the symbol, emotion is 
discharged at a common target and the idiosyncrasy of real ideas is blotted out'. As 
Habermas states, the function of mass media is about 'exploiting events that attract 
attention' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194). 
In doing so, the news media adheres to the psychology and techniques associated 
with 'pictorial publicity connected to well-tested human interest topics' (p. 194). 
Looking at the front page of The West Australian over a year, for example, shows 
that approximately 85% of them depict families, children or animals. In the 
aftermath of the Jakarta bombing and the Beslan school siege we were faced with 
depictions of injured children, or parents and soldiers carrying injured children. 
However, we very rarely see injured Iraqi children, even though 'more than half the 
deaths reportedly caused by the occupying forces were women and children' 
(Burnham, Garfield, Khudhairi, Lafta & Robert, 2004, p. 1863). Habermas argues 
35 
that calculated representations reorient public opinion 'by the formation of new 
authorities or symbols which will have acceptance' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194). In 
this case, acquiring public sympathy and acclamation of the war in Iraq, and the 
'war on terrorism' in general. 
The Sydney Morning Herald's political reporter, Louise Dodson, claimed that 
'suddenly the sedate and slickly managed federal election campaign had been 
disrupted' (Dodson, 2004). Dodson incorporated the attack into the campaign 
narrative by arguing that how 'Mr Howard and Mr Latham respond to the renewed 
threat of terrorism will play a large part in determining the outcome of the election' 
(Dodson, 2004). The ABC news and current affairs programming presented the 
story in a similar manner. On the evening of the Jakarta bombing, as well as the 
following evening, the 7.30 Report dedicated the entire show to covering the 
terrorist attack. The program's host, Kerry O'Brien, said that in the context of an 
election campaign the attack on Australian interests, albeit abroad, was 
unprecedented, and that the 'reverberations from the bomb in Jakarta stopped the 
campaigning politicians in their tracks this afternoon in Australia' (O'Brien, 2004). 
The program included interviews with the Foreign and Shadow Foreign Ministers, 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and terrorism experts. O'Brien claimed that 'how politicians 
respond to this affront and a nation of electors read and react to it, will dramatically 
inform the election campaign' (O'Brien, 2004). It was clear at this stage that the 
news media were expecting that the bombing would have some bearing on the 
campaign, and how the public ultimately voted. 
There was speculation in the media over whether or not the bombing in Jakarta was 
used to create pressure on the Australian government to withdraw its troops from 
Iraq. Such a scenario had already played out in Spain only days before their 
national elections, with the incumbent losing government. After the Madrid train 
bombing Mick Keelty (Keelty, 2004) declared that 'the reality is, if this turns out to 
be Islamic extremists responsible for this bombing in Spain, it's more likely to be 
linked to the position that Spain and other allies took on issues such as Iraq'. 
Before making such a claim Keelty may have done himself a service by reflecting 
on Ernest Renan's (cited in Said, 1995, p. 148) claim that it is 'better to be 
mistaken along with the nation than to be right with those who tell it hard truths'. 
Downer countered Keelty's comment by claiming that he was 'expressing a view 
which reflects a lot of the propaganda we're getting from Al Qaeda' (Aust warns 
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Spain, 2004). General Cosgrove was also prompted to comment. While believing 
that Keelty and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were doing a 'fantastic' job, 
Cosgrove stated that 'I see the same intelligence as [Keelty has] seen and I disagree 
with him on this occasion'. Keelty' s comments prompted a public reprimand from 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. Keelty had to be publicly censured to show a 
unified front against terrorism, and, most importantly, reinforce the perception of 
John Howard as a strong leader. 
Security and the economy have always been key factors involved in controlling 
populations and consolidating their support, even for some of the most unpalatable 
government policies. This is mostly because of the complexity involved in 
international relations, the disinterest in military budgets and the clandestine nature 
of security agencies (Firth, 1999, p. 70). These are some of the reasons why 
reporters, such as Greg Sheridan of The Australian, believe 'John Howard owns 
the American alliance politically'... the war on terror and... owns national 
security' (Sheridan, 2004). It is also no doubt why governments choose this over 
other policy areas to run on during a campaign, as it is an easier platform from 
which to attain public support. Habermas states that within an expanded mediatised 
public sphere public opinion has the potential to become the: 
object to be molded [sic] in connection with a staged display of, 
and manipulative propagation of, publicity in the service of 
persons and institutions, consumer goods, and programs 
(Habermas, 1989, p. 236). 
Michel Foucault (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 23) claims that to successfully govern a 
state is to 'reinforce the state itself', and that 'government is only possible if the 
strength of the state is known; it can thus be sustained'. It is important, then, that a 
government gives the public at least the perception of strength, power and control 
through performances played out in the news media. While not privy to the internal 
manoeuvrings of the two major parties, it would not be a stretch to argue, 
regardless of party specific goals, that the mechanics of party operations do not 
differ drastically. Therefore, from the perspective of a news media saturated 
electorate, the perceptions that a public has of its politicians is everything. 
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2.4. Insiders and Outsiders 
L. F. Crisp, Emeritus Professor of Political Science in the Australian National 
University, believes that 'Democratic Cabinet government based on a virtually two 
party system does not allow either major contender for power to be a 'purist' or an 
'absolutist' in ideological matters' (Crisp, 1983, p. 53). In this election we saw 
reports of Latham seeking to win the aged vote and Howard talking about forests. 
Robert Cox (in Habermas, 2001, p. 58) argues that: 
All politicians move to the center to compete on the basis of 
personality and of who is best able to manage the adjustment in 
economy and society necessary to sustain competitiveness in the 
global market. 
Leading up to, and during, the election campaign both leaders appeared to be 
advocating less government intervention, and greater public autonomy. However, 
the political philosophies and the way that the news media report them are 
ideologically oriented. Historically, the Australian Labor Party, says Crisp, centres 
its image on a democratic socialist ideology, while Liberal Party ideology consists 
of liberal private enterprise capitalism (Crisp, 1983, p. 53). Rhetorically speaking, 
Latham has his 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Howard his ·battlers' and 'elites'. 
Habermas cautiously distinguishes the 'loosely organised actors who "emerge 
from" the public, as it were, from other actors merely "appearing before'' the 
public' (Habermas, 1996, p. 3 7 5). Actors emerging from the public, or civil 
society, depend largely on sponsored support in the fonn of finance, organisation, 
knowledge and social capital. 
For example, one businessman, Ian Melrose, attempted to have an influence on the 
moral perceptions of the Australian public, and used his own money to finance a 
series advertisements (Appendix C) highlighting the plight of the East Timorese 
people affected by the Australian government's dealings over contested gas 
reserves. Melrose ·paid around $30,000 for a 30-second television commercial' 
(Businessman takes on the Govt, 2004). According to Melrose, his motivation 
came from 'involvement with health causes in East Timor, and as a result. .. I've 
decided that something's got to be done, where East Timor gets a decent health 
system' (2004 ). Channel Seven and SBS have recently pulled the advertisements 
claiming that the advertisements depicted graphic scenes not suitable for children. 
However, Melrose claims that the advertisements where cleared by the appropriate 
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authorities deeming them suitable for free to air television (Timor Sea justice, 
2005). This example demonstrates how difficult it has become for members of the 
public to raise an issue for public debate. Even with the finance available, securing 
support from large influential media organisations is not always assured, especially 
if it is in contradiction or conflicts with the internal agendas and strategies of 
private television networks, despite their continual appropriation of the forums of 
public debate. 
The actors appearing before the public have organisational power, resources and 
endorsement with which to conduct their endeavours from the very start. The 
motivation of these actors is derived from the reward of successful continuation of 
the organisation itself, and the profit or power to be made that legitimates their 
existence. These actors may include representatives of political parties, unions, 
professional and pressure groups (Habermas, 1996, p. 3 7 5). In the case of political 
parties, inter-organisational relations with other autonomous actors are sustained 
through an exchange of power, resources and social influence. On the topic of 
receiving political party donations, for example, Dr Andrew Leigh, an economist in 
the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, and a 
member of the ALP, writes that: 
the biggest advantages for the Coalition were in the finance 
sector (ANZ, JP Morgan), food and pastoral (lnghams, 
Manildra), industrial and manufacturing (Pratt, Amcor) and 
resource companies. Sectors that most strongly favoured the 
ALP were professional firms (accounting, law), clubs and hotels 
(the Australian Hotels Association) and the union movement 
(Leigh & Wolfers, 2004). 
Roberts and Crossley claim that the style and manner in which modem election 
campaigns that are focused on winning votes through promises of public spending 
undercut and make Labour movements impotent (Roberts and Crossley, 2004, pp. 
7-8). During the election campaign, headlines and opinion columns in The 
Australian contained articles focused on the ALP and their supposed attitude to 
labour and industrial reforms. One The Weekend Australian Opinion column was 
entitled 'LABOR MUST STAND UP FOR THE WORKERS' (Labor must stand, 2004, 
p. 18) and another front-page headline made the claim that 'BUSINESS DUMPS ON 
LABOR' (Gluyas & Boreham, September 18-19, 2004, p. 1 ). The first article 
supports the government's intended industrial relations reform, an area that is high 
on the list of the coalition government's policy priorities. Asked, in an interview 
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with radio 3AW's Neil Mitchell, about the government's position on industrial 
relations, the Treasurer Peter Costello stated (Costello, 2004): 'Unfair dismissal 
number one'. The second article conveys the apparent fears that large Australian 
corporations hold toward any changes a Latham government may make to 
industrial relations, and an increased role for unions in work place negotiations. 
Along similar lines The Australian reported the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia's (CBA) Chief Executive, David Murray, as saying that he would always 
be wary of reforms that would 'threaten productivity' that has been fastest where 
there has been a 'flexibility of (employment) contracts' (Gluyas & Boreham, 
2004). Murray's take on flexibility echoes a speech made by John Howard, in 
February 2004, to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, where 
he stated that 'simplifying the award system and [the] framework for agreements at 
the workplace level has provided greater flexibility for both employees and 
employers', which has led to 'greater labour market flexibility, higher productivity 
[and] a fall in unemployment (Howard, 2004). In this case, however, The 
Australian fails to mention Murray's past dealings with CBA staff, and instead uses 
Murray's influential position to supply an opinion that discredits Latham's 
proposed social IR reforms. 
Murray's comments came only one year after he oversaw a restructuring of the 
Commonwealth Bank that was designed to 'empower, motivate and skill staff 
(Commonwealth plans, 2003). The strategy also proposed cutting 3 700 staff, 
whose job security was probably already very tenuous, as approximately '80 per 
cent of new jobs in Western industrialised nations are not permanent positions. 
Full-time jobs have risen by 14 per cent and part-time jobs by 70 per cent' 
(Letcher, 2001). Furthermore, Australian Bureau of Statistics figures show that 
jobless rates have increased, and close to two million people are seeking 
employment in vain, which subsequently has a discouraging effect on others 
seeking jobs. This does not take into account other disadvantaged job seekers such 
as, for example, those lacking the appropriate skills and training needed to find 
gainful employment (Letcher, 2001 ). In a recent interview with Associate 
Professor of Philosophy, Giovanna Borradori, Habermas reasons that our 
communicative relationships with others in society are defined by the normative 
values to which we grow accustomed. Habermas (cited in Borradori, 2003, p. 35) 
claims that 'we in the West do live in peaceful and well-to-do societies, and yet 
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they contain a structural violence that, to a certain degree, we have gotten used to'. 
He goes on to say that common language and experience witnessed collectively via 
the news media cultivates a climate of 'common background convictions, self-
evident cultural truths and reciprocal expectations' (p. 35). Based on these 
communicative conditions, claims Habermas: 
the coordination of action runs through the ordinary 
language games, through mutually raised and at least 
implicitly recognised validity claims in the public space of 
more or less good reasons. 
So, our understanding of each other is very much reliant on the institutions that 
inform our understanding of the society in which we live. However, it is precisely 
because we share a common perspective on our society through these institutions, 
like the news media, that these social bonds can be exploited, where 'conflicts arise 
from distortion in communication, from misunderstanding and incomprehension, 
from insincerity and deception' (p. 35). Quite apart from the common good of a 
society, these common social bonds can be used as a cynical tool against an 
indoctrinated public. For example, when the powerful claim that the public must 
make sacrifices, usually in the form of job or wage cuts, in order to keep a 
particular industry afloat. This tactic can only work if most of the public believe 
the economic rationalism that is at the heart of such arguments. 
On Lateline, Murray stated that 'nobody likes the idea that we'll have less 
employment, but the idea that we will be ineffective as a competitor in the 
financial services industry is even worse. We have to be competitive, and this is 
the best way of doing it'. Patently, employment environments consisting of a high 
level of casual and part time jobs that rely on fluctuating market trends of 
corporations place employees in a position of greater financial risk and job 
uncertainty. John Howard would have people believe that emancipating workers 
from the reins of bureaucracy and unionism gives them more freedom, but when 
markets dictate the state of human resources the powerful actually have the 
potential to rob the vulnerable of their freedom, and hence a 'failure to protect 
them from the misuse of economic power' (Popper, 1974, p. 124). A collaborative 
research paper into transitional labour markets, conducted by the University of 
Melbourne's Centre for Public Policy, finds that: 
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union membership, and hence bargaining power, is particularly 
low in those occupations and industries most prone to precarious 
working conditions, which means that enterprise bargaining 
merely exacerbates the fragmentation of employment conditions. 
Some form of regulation through legislation or centralised 
bargaining may be necessary (Considine, Hancock, Howe & 
Ziguras, 2004, p. 10). 
As Habermas observes, corporations and political parties left to their 'own internal 
logics' can have a destructive effect on society. It was a hollow boast, then, when 
Prime Minister Howard proudly . announced to The Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia (CEDA) crowd that 'we now have an economy where 
fewer than one in five private sector workers belongs to a trade union' (Howard, 
2004). We are only left to ponder whether Prime Minister Howard's delight in low 
levels of union membership and reduced job security characterises what he terms 
'modem conservatism in social policy' (2004). However, as long as the news 
media continue to give a voice to the voices of large organisations over civil 
society their philosophies on society will remain dominant, and to some degree 
accepted as valid. 
While there are news media organisations, like the ABC, SBS, The Age and The 
Sydney Morning Herald, who often report on corporations' shortcomings, other 
organisations, such as The Australian, generally tend to be a little more 
conservative in this department. Turner claims that: 
As media corporations diversify, and as their level of integration 
with the business sector as a whole increases, it is not surprising 
that we have seen an increasing degree of discretion in dealing 
with financial and commercial stories 
In this respect, we can argue that the relationship between the corporate sector and 
the corporate news media is an unsurprisingly protective one. When the news 
media focus upon the nuances of domestic economic concerns they tend to ignore 
the political push for Australia to have a more active role within a global economy. 
In doing so the news media resolve the problem of reporting on the human cost of 
such economic rationalism. Dee Margets claims that over the past twenty years, 
during a period of great economic restructuring and rationalising in Australia, 
much of the media focus has been distracted from the bigger picture of Australia's 
global economic role. This is inconsistent, claims Margets, in a lecture delivered at 
Curtin University, televised by community broadcaster Channel 31, because while 
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the mainstream news media report on domestic issues of the General Sales Tax 
(GST), petrol prices and the National Competition Policy (NCP), they really should 
have more focus, analysis and political accountability on shifts that will have 
widespread economic fallout, such as the recent Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States. As has already been suggested in previous examples, journalists, 
publicity agents and members of the press 'to a certain extent control the entry of 
topics, contributions, and authors into the mass-media-dominated public sphere' 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 376). If the processes of campaigns and politics are in effect 
invisible to the public, yet journalists are going to report anyway, political parties 
would rather have some influence over what the media report. 
Media control has become a necessary element of a political party's operations. 
Ward states that during the 1970s, Malcom Fraser formed the Government 
Information Unit (GIU), which was designed purely to control news media and to 
become alert to news media developments in general. Despite the Australian 
Labour Party's protestations of GIU' s existence, the ALP created their own media 
control body called the National Media Liaison Service (NMLS), dubbed aNiMLS 
by the Canberra Press Gallery (Ward, 1997, p. 170). At the time Paul Kelly (cited 
in p. 170), a former press gallery correspondent, described the aNiMLS as a 'de 
facto research unit for the press gallery'. Both GIU and the NMLS can be viewed 
as partisan political apparatuses. Tiffen believes that since the 1970s and 1980s, 
political campaigning practices have progressively made them an inadequate 
'vehicle for accountability and meaningful public choice' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 152). 
Sydney Morning Herald journalist and once ABC's Media Watch host, David Marr, 
claims that: 
Canberra doesn't leak in the way it once did. The cabinet 
and the party room are superbly disciplined. Bureaucrats 
are nervous. Leaks happen, but these days the government 
leaks to favoured journalists who give the public sneak 
previews of government policy (Marr, 2004). 
This approach has largely been at the expense of speaking plainly and openly to the 
public on policy matters. Margets claims that there is little public discussion 
promoted by government because central to any debate on these topics would be 
the ongoing privatisation of public utilities and the casualisation, or increased 
'flexibility', of Australia's workforce. This, together with Firth's observation that 
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news media editors do not use foreign policy issues because they are too 
complicated for audiences, means that there is little coverage of developments that 
significantly affect Australian's lives. The point here is that alternative economic 
viewpoints that may counter established political and economic experts do not 
often get a hearing in the mainstream press. That is, while there were reports that 
followed Mark Vaile's progress on the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, 
and other reports that addressed Labor's initial opposition to the agreement, the 
FT A did not become a defining election issue. This, despite the controversy that 
continued over the effect that the FT A would have on the Pharmaceuticals Benefits 
Scheme (PBS), shows how debate can be buried even during the heightened 
political awareness of an election. 
For political parties' organisational affiliations, together with mainstream news 
media attention can lend support to their campaign, and define election policy. The 
philosophies behind news media stories are, to some degree, complex. For example, 
judging The Australian by its actions, the CEO and editors perhaps felt that the way 
the government handled asylum seekers was ethically questionable during the 2001 
election campaign and, therefore, took the government to task in a major front page 
story for its cynical management of the children overboard affair. On matters of 
finance and the economy, however, the editors and opinion writers of The 
Australian seem to hold a different perspective, regardless of ethical concerns, as 
was highlighted in the previous section. 
As businesses themselves, they have a vested interest in deregulation and the reform 
of cross-media ownership laws that will allow for a greater share in domestic and 
global media industries (Acker, 2000, pp. 187-195). There is also another factor, 
according to The Australian's CEO Michael Stutchbury, that determines the content 
to be published or broadcast in the news media. Stutchbury's research into 
Australian defamation law was delivered as a speech at the International Media 
Ethics Conference in Canberra on July 4, 2002, and appears in transcript form, 
entitled 'Rising Culture of Suppression', on Crikey.com. It is worth mentioning that 
Crikey.com (About Crikey, 2005) defines itself an online news media website that 
is 'independent and ... not part of a media empire', and brings its readers 'the inside 
word on what's really going on in politics, government, media'. Stutchbury (2005) 
argues that: 
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High quality journalism... is in the public interest. Yet, the 
substantial and increasing defamation costs imposed upon media 
companies act, in effect, as a tax upon quality journalism. In the 
political debate over media regulation, much is made of the need 
for "diversity" of media outlets. One source of diversity is small-
scale and low-cost outlets, sometimes renegade in nature, which 
irritate the big companies in various ways. The crap-shoot of the 
defamation explosion can threaten to wipe out such outlets such 
as Crikey.com. And in much more pervasive ways, the uncertain 
threat of defamation litigation has a chilling effect on the media's 
ability to vigorously report and analyse public events. In this 
way, the public's right to know and its ability to speak out is 
infringed, to the detriment of the democratic system. 
Selective journalism, due either to the vested interests of news media organisations, 
or forced upon them by defamation laws or as a result of the closed nature of 
government, demonstrates a failing in the systems and institutions that are 
supposed to inform our judgments that ultimately shape the public's perspective on 
government and their political institutions. 
In this respect, legitimacy of government derived from the processes of private 
news media organisations, distinct from a reasoning public sphere, can be called 
into question as without consistency in journalism there will likely be scepticism 
among the public. Unlike non-public opinion, such as the clandestine opinions of 
political parties and corporations that, nonetheless, have public implications, public 
opinion must emerge from the public sphere itself after actors with strategic intent 
candidly put their case or policy forward to private citizens (Habermas, 1996, p. 
364). 'Candidly' is the operative word in this case, as the public must be aware of 
the kinds of activities public representatives are conducting in their name. If 
opinion is seen to be manipulated then it is most likely that voters will resist or 
disengage from the political process. One unionist, who has no particular liking for 
either party leader, claimed that while watching our politicians slug it out on 
television may be entertaining, 'it leaves the entire institution discredited in the 
eyes of the public. Which is classic Tory political tactics - take away faith in 
politics and social change will never flourish' (Dirty Deeds, 2002). The following 
accounts are examples of how the 'discrediting' can occur. 
Despite calling the election date, Howard allowed the Senate to proceed with an 
inquiry into the children overboard affair, officially known as 'a certain maritime 
incident'. Howard stated in The Age that 'I didn't want anybody to suggest that I 
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was trying to prevent the Senate doing any pointless political business it might 
want to do' (Campaign to be about trust, 2004). This, however, did not mean that 
the government would be a passive observer to the inquiry. Patrick Walters of The 
Australian, who carries the title of 'National Security editor', claimed that Senator 
Robert Hill (in Walters, 2004) believed Labor was 'trying to drag the Senate into 
the gutter rather than debate issues of real interest to the electorate'. Again another 
government minister, this time Robert Hill, was trying to discredit any action taken 
by the Senate, claiming that any new probe into the Scrafton revelations was an 
'unprecedented abuse of the Senate'. Howard and his government continually 
played down and dismissed the new children overboard allegations as irrelevant, 
claiming the public were bored of the issue. Howard (cited in Tell voters about 
future, 2004) stated: 
I do believe that the Australian public want to hear from both 
parties about the next 10 years, not about the last three days of 
the last election campaign. 
John Anderson, leader of the National Party and Deputy Prime Minister, also 
helped in trying to control any potential public interest in the inquiry, while also 
protecting Howard's credibility. On Channel Nine's Today Show, a less hostile 
interview arena for the government, Anderson (cited in Today Show, August 18 
2004) pointed to a 'ferocious campaign from some quarters, to establish the 
premise that we can't be trusted'. Anderson stated 'I trust the Prime Minister, and I 
trust him very deeply, and I believe that people who know him trust him and I 
believe that the bulk of Australians do as well' (August 18, 2004). The rhetoric 
coming from the government attempted to show the Labor Party in a hostile light, 
as though they were the ones under Senate scrutiny. Government ministers' 
interactions with the press were aimed at trying to placate the electorate and divert 
attention away from the Scrafton claims. 
As already stated, The Australian's stance was not supportive of the government's 
handling of the children overboard affair. As a result, opinions that may not 
otherwise have surfaced were made public by the newspaper. On August 16, The 
Australian ran comprehensive story entitled: 'REVEALED: THE MISSING LINK IN 
THE CHILDREN OVERBOARD AFFAIR. HOW ARD WAS TOLD THE TRUTH' 
(Walters, 2004, p. 1). The article, comprised of a number of different sections 
throughout the newspaper, provided detailed background and recent updates. The 
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'missing link' was of course the former semor advisor to Peter Reith, Mike 
Scrafton. Scrafton's presence just prior to the campaign was a central reason that 
Howard was running his campaign on 'trust', or what Scrafton describes as the 
government sidestepping a 'critical issue' (the children overboard affair), 
trivialised and distorted by the slogan 'truth in government' (Scrafton, 2004). In a 
letter published in The Australian, on the 16 August, 2004, Scrafton wrote: 
The report of the Senate committee inquiring into a Certain 
Maritime Incident - the children overboard affair - found the 
inquiry had been "significantly hampered" by my refusal to 
testify before it. The salient issue for the committee was "the 
extent of the Prime Minister's knowledge of the false nature of 
the report that children were thrown overboard" and therefore 
"the extent to which the Government as a whole wilfully misled 
the Australian people on the eve of an election" (Scrafton, 2004, 
p. 8). 
In this new chapter of the children overboard affair, Scrafton rhetorically asks: 
'What would I have told the Senate Committee?' Scrafton claims that after viewing 
video tapes, taken from the HMAS Adelaide, on November 7 2004, that were 
supposed to show children being thrown overboard by asylum seekers he spoke to 
John Howard three times by mobile phone. Scrafton writes that: 
In the course of those calls I recounted to him [Howard] that: a) 
the tape was at best inconclusive as to whether there were any 
children in the water but certainly didn't support the proposition 
that the event occurred; b) that the photographs that had been 
released in early October were definitely of the sinking of the 
refugee boat on October 8 and not of any children being thrown 
into the water; and c) that no one in Defence that I dealt with on 
the matter still believed any children were thrown overboard. 
During the last conversation, the Prime Minister asked me how 
it was that he had a report from the Office of National 
Assessments confirming the children overboard incident. I 
replied that I had gained the impression that the report had as its 
source the public statements of the then minister for 
immigration, Philip Ruddock (p. 8). 
When the Prime Minister asked how this could be the case, Scrafton advised that 
he should ask the director general of the ONA, Kim Jones (p. 8). The objective that 
ALP Senators had, then, was to determine what the Prime Minister knew at the 
time and if the Prime Minister had in fact spoken to Jones. 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Senator Conroy, asked Senator Hill 'Did the 
Prime Minister take Mr Scrafton's advice before he released it to the media at the 
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National Press Club on 8 November 2001 ?' (Senate Hansard, 2004, p. 26626). 
Senator Robert Hill continued with the Coalition's campaign strategy, stating: 
I suspect that this reflects the Labor Party campaign for this 
election. This is the alternative that they are putting to the 
Australian people. no policies, no alternative vision for Australia. 
Where is their tax policy? What about interest rates? We 
remember that when Labor was last in government housing 
interest rates were 17 per cent (p. 26626). 
Despite the renewed news media coverage of the children overboard affair, there 
was no way of knowing how the electorate were responding to the issue of truth in 
government. Hugh MacKay's suspicions of a 'disengaged', 'leave it to the leader' 
(McKay & Brown, 2004) mentality prevailing within certain sections of the 
electorate was beginning to sound prophetic. Grahame Morris, a 'former' advisor 
to Prime Minister Howard, predicted that it would be unlikely that the ALP would 
continue with the children overboard Senate inquiry. Morris (2004) claimed on 
Lateline that: 
I would actually doubt that because they may well find that this 
piddly little thing is running through the entire election campaign 
and it is overshadowing their education policy, their health story, 
their tax policy, their family policy. 
The news media did indeed appear to mirror the government's belief that the public 
were bored with the Scrafton enquiry, as the Scrafton saga was now competing 
with terrorist acts playing out in Russia, and the bombing of the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta. 
Participants on the Special Broadcasting Service's (SBS) own focus group forum 
conducted on the program Insight, an episode entitled Who Do You Trust?, voiced 
concerns at the level of trust the public had to oblige the government. One woman 
(cited in Who Do You Trust?, 2004) made a claim that in her own experience: 
we have to take our politicians on face value because, frankly, we 
may not have the resources, we may not have the education to 
gather source documents, to look at source documents and come to 
an intelligent decision. 
During the forum there were a number of comments that reflected this opinion. 
Some members of the Insight audience felt that they were not being adequately 
informed vital information about how Australia is governed. They demonstrated a 
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certain amount of contempt toward newspapers, with one man ( cited in Who Do 
You Trust?, 2004) stating that 'I know that whenever I pick up this newspaper 
[holds up a copy of The Australian], they're for John Howard and George Bush. 
Everything they say is manipulated'. 
Feedback from people participating in another focus group study conducted by 
Michael Pusey among middle Australia indicate that it is difficult to: 
orient [their] actions to others, and how to find, and to read, 
reliable feedback in a depleted civil society in which informal 
communication channels seem scrambled with noise and 
contradiction (Pusey, 2003, p. 136). 
A study by David Denemark into televised election campaigning in Australia used 
the Converse model of media effects. Denemark maintains that central to 
'Converse's model of media effects on electoral behaviour is the importance of 
individuals' existing political interest, loyalties and awareness in mediating those 
effects' (Denemark, 2002, p. 663). The above examples perhaps show individuals 
who question, analyse and find bias in the information that they receive via the 
press or television, yet find it frustrating that there are no clear representations of 
political authority and power. In addition, Iyengar, Peters and Kinder ( cited in p. 
664) discovered that televised political communication had a substantial effect on 
news media viewers who were 'less able or willing to counter-argue with a news 
presentation', while their politically informed opposites appeared better able to 
'resist agenda-setting through effective counter-arguing'. What Denemark claims 
these findings show is that those with the least amount of interest in politics are the 
same people who will more likely be influenced by television news media coverage 
of an election campaign. These relationships become complex when the 'two-step' 
flow of communication theory is taken into account. Two-step flow of 
communication theory, attributed to Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, examines the 
'informal social relationships' between 'opinion leaders', those who are to a greater 
or lesser degree engaged with messages via mass media, and those whose exposure 
to media content is limited or nonexistent (De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1982, p. 
193). Importantly, opinion leaders are often, though not always, from a similar 
social structure, which is a 'key variable in determining who would influence [and] 
shape the voting intentions of those to whom they were passing on information' (p. 
193). 
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A society is comprised of many views and opinions, which is why authority and 
expert opinion alone can never democratically represent legitimate public opinion. 
Non-public opinions that act as the self appointed voice of the people are either 
misguided in their assumptions or deliberately manipulative. C. W. Mills claims 
that journalists and political analysts tend to overemphasise middle levels of power. 
While neglecting the top and bottom of the social structure, political journalists risk 
obscuring the structures of power in their entirety (Mills, 2000, p. 244): 
As a professor or as a free-lance intellectual, the political analyst is 
generally on the middle levels of power himself. He knows the top 
only by gossip; the bottom, if at all, only by 'research'. But he is at 
home with the leaders of the middle level, and, as a thinker himself, 
with their bargaining (p. 245) 
Middle level political commentators and journalists are still, like Martin Luther 
before them, 'locked in a battle for men's minds' (Anderson, 2003, p. 40). As 
opinion leaders in their own right, they can use their influence to convey certain 
opinions to an audience of listeners whose own unspoken opinions they can 
articulate. The success of commentators like Alan Jones and John Laws can be 
attributed to their persuasive and shrewd use of the vernacular. As Benedict 
Anderson observes, 'Protestantism was always fundamentally on the offensive, 
precisely because it knew how to make use of the expanding vernacular print-
market being created by capitalism' (p. 40). One need only exchange the word 
Protestantism for its counterpart, the ideology of 'consumerism', and we have a 
neat description of the commercial media industry today. That is, the pervasiveness 
and popularity of commentators such as Jones and Laws is a predictable symptom 
of an amalgamation between capitalism, the news media and politics. It highlights 
a system that values profit as its own end, where the integration of corporate news 
media and political power sustain the conditions under which the channels of 
public discourse are severely compromised (Acker, 2000, pp. 185-187). Perhaps 
this is why political and social commentators like Paul Kelly, Janet Albrechtsen 
and Philip Adams can appear together in The Australian without apparent 
contradiction, despite often extreme political and social differences. 
It would indeed be difficult to understand these relationships based on small 
groupings of individuals within a social stratum in the context of an election. Given 
that the key determinant of two-step flow is the influence of opinion leaders is 
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horizontal, it could be argued that any one social group may share the same set of 
social and economic concerns and may, therefore, reflect a mutual understanding. 
Habermas argues that Katz and Lazarsfeld's 'opinion leaders' work on a much 
greater vertical, hierarchical level, with the wealthier and more educated having a 
certain amount of influence over those in the lower status groups who hold no 
particular party loyalty. However, interaction that occurs in this way should not be 
mistaken for public opinion and will-formation within the public sphere. Why 
public opinion formation under these circumstances cannot be considered as 
legitimately emerging from the public sphere is because these roles become fixed, 
creating a two-tier system of influence that precludes rational-critical debate 
(Habermas, 1989, p. 213). That is, opinions held by opinion leaders have a 
tendency to go unchallenged and their legitimacy assumed without argument. 
Given the opportunity to respond, however, sometimes reveals a more complex 
truth. 
During SBS's Insight program, for example, journalist Margo Kingston and John 
Roskam, a political scientist and former coalition advisor, assumed the existence of 
two types of voter. The first is a small group of 'elites' who have the time and 
money to concern themselves with issues of honesty and trust in government, such 
as the children overboard affair and the invasion of Iraq at the hands of the alleged 
'coalition of the willing'. The second group are the working class, Howard's 
'battlers', who are only concerned with interest rates and economic security. One 
woman (cited in Who Do You Trust?, 2004) from the focus group resented the idea 
that someone could consider that there was only a small elite group of people to 
whom the issue of truthfulness is important. Continuing, she said: 
I'm not a member of a small, elite group, I'm a member of a large 
working class. The principle of truth, of an elected representative is 
such a fundamental core issue I find it hard to believe that there are 
other people out there who can say, "I have my doubts about this 
person's fundamental integrity," yet "I'm going to set their basic lack of 
regard for the truth aside and I'm going to accept their reporting at face 
value," I just find that inconceivable. 
This demonstrates that it is only through rational discourse that generalisations, 
symbolism and ideology can be avoided and a move toward understanding is 
achieved through communicative bonds. Proper dialogue and discourse are 
essential ingredients that are missing from the news media channels that deal in 
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political comment, and as a result such comments are often met with hostility and 
resentment. Kingston's distinction between the two voter bases may have validity, 
and she no doubt used the distinction as a convenient way to argue a point. 
However, faced with a member of the public whom Kingston identified as working 
class and therefore without a capacity for moral reflection highlights the 
complexity of communicative relations. Furthermore, it demonstrates how 
impoverished polls, demography and the overall scientific reduction of society can 
be, and the assumptions, manipulation and miscommunication they can cause when 
used deliberately, irresponsibly or without thinking. 
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Conclusion 
The function that the new mass communications had in the previous centuries was 
to maintain mercantilist connections among the bourgeois. What followed was a 
period in which actors in government became open to public scrutiny that was 
cultivated by the connection of private persons coming together as a public via 
mediated accounts by persons close to power themselves. However, news and 
information has in itself become a commodity, and the news media, as private 
organisations, seek legitimacy by way of public acclamation and loyalty in order to 
remain competitive enough to exist alongside their rivals. Additionally, in response 
to the pervasiveness of the mass media, political parties, and their affiliates, use the 
news media in much the same way as corporations do in selling manufactured 
products and services to the public. Subsequently, the intended function of the 
news media, to inform the opinions of private persons who then test these opinions 
together as a public via rational-critical debate, continues to be eclipsed by 
powerful and influential actors external to any common sphere of lived experience 
and communicative bonds that this generates. That is, opinions held by powerful 
organisations outside the common concerns of everyday life experienced by private 
persons are reached without the acknowledgement of the public to be addressed, 
but whose acclamation is sought publicly. As a theory that claims that our news 
media systems cannot adequately execute their function as an institution that holds 
government accountable, Habermas's theory of an eroded public sphere is 
predictably a controversial one. The news media and the mass media in general 
now serve many functions within a diverse Australian culture. They entertain, 
educate, and keep us informed about the society in which we live, and this is as it 
should be. However, the emphasis that the news media place on entertainment 
value is a direct result of the competitive nature of market economy news media, 
where the highest profile, highest rating and most entertaining stories have priority. 
The techniques used in an attempt to attract public support for private organisations 
often rely on the acquisition of the nascent, untested private opinions of isolated 
persons. That is, private opinions can be manipulated by surveys and polls because 
the way in which a question is posed and structured can inform the answer. While 
poll results can have a positive role to play in providing an idea of public sentiment 
on an issue they should be used with care, as the great concern is that results may 
be used to determine government policy, or to legitimate a policy without public 
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debate. The other concern is the way in which they are used by the news media in 
the creation of stories that are reported as if factual, and as a result news becomes 
prophecy, rather than journalism. This kind of integration is again an example that 
further distorts information intended to inform a public with disinterested 
information, which results in a lack of public faith in news media or political 
institutions. 
Despite the growing forms of new media available online, the majority of people 
source their news media from traditional forms like television and newspapers. 
Much of the public do not have the time, education, money or resources available 
to research what their politicians tell them. As such, news organisations should feel 
that they have a great responsibility toward the information they provide to the 
public about our politicians and government. On reading Habermas, one can only 
conclude that without an informed public there are fewer opinions and active 
members of the public emerging from within the public sphere that have the ability 
to express opinions on our media or political institutions. News and current affairs 
programs such as the ABC's Lateline and 7.30 Report, SBS's Insight do offer the 
public a chance to hear different perspectives being argued on a given political or 
social issue. The interactions between experts, focus groups and politicians on 
Insight seems a very informative and engaging way of addressing concerns 
common to public experience. This kind of debate is also useful in exposing 
assumptions and crossing communicative barriers raised by the distortion and the 
categorisation of commercialised integrated media that makes the public sphere 
ineffective. That is, while there is not always agreement on certain issues between 
the participating parties, a communicative bond is created during the process of 
rational debate. 
By the same token, however, SBS, along with Channel Seven, has demonstrated 
that they can discriminate between the public voices that they allow broadcast time 
to for the purposes of advertisements and public messages. While they happily 
advertise cars, finance and computers, all aimed at the higher end of the market, 
they will not broadcast an advertisement depicting the plight of needy East 
Timorese people. To remain balanced, however, we should also note that the 
journalists and editors of news programs may be constrained by other factors, such 
as defamation laws, that subvert a free and open flow of information. The task of 
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holding power to account is not an easy one, but, as White and Pilger argue, such 
pressures should be ignored in the pursuit of an open society. 
However, one of Scrafton's major coups was being able to have letters published in 
The Australian in regard to the 'children overboard' affair. In a chapter devoted to 
the relationship between the public service and the press, Henry Mayer (Mayer, 
1994, pp. 132-140) offers the suggestion, that perhaps in the future, public servants 
will have a greater public role in informing and keeping up to date with the press 
on political matters. While it is arguable what influence, if any, the Scrafton 
inquiry had on the election campaign, none would argue that the case did not 
generate interest among the news media, albeit briefly. However, the Scrafton 
letters may do more to show the selectiveness of the letters page - after all what 
editor could resist publishing them. Letters pages in newspapers, while making 
public opinion visible, do not as effectively contribute to public debate as well as 
real-time interaction. In the pursuit of fairness, equal weight is given to all letters 
and there is usually fifty-fifty split between politically left and right leaning 
contributors. This seems to be the only real way of being fair, but a number of 
things should be taken into account, such as strength of argument and why editors 
from one week to the next choose letter topics. It is interesting to note that in the 
recent wake of government rollbacks, such as the Medicare safety net, The 
Australian letters page (Rotten to the core, 2005, p. 18) was filled to capacity with 
vehement anti-government contributions. It is as though The Australian had offered 
a cathartic outlet for disgruntled voters. As such, it can perhaps be viewed as an 
attempt at placating a section of their reading audience and a reinforcing loyalty to 
the newspaper. This altruism will no doubt eventually fade, as will the cavalier 
behaviour of the government, the closer we move toward the next election. 
While research relating to audience reception and behaviour toward news media is 
amorphous, it would be a mistake to simply label media effects on the public 
sphere too difficult to interpret. Generally speaking, there seems to be a correlation 
between the format, quality, speed, volume and frequency, of public 
communications and the effectiveness of political strategies. This is at least true in 
the minds of political strategists and politicians. Political campaigns have been 
reduced to slogans, fear mongering, discrediting of opponents and the choice of 
stagnant policy repetition and resistance to debate, rather than engaging in 
discourse that involves new ideas, alternative perspectives and real-time public 
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op1mons on policy. While we cannot say with any certainty how an audience 
receives and interprets news media, we can say that since it is the source of many 
people's political information politicians, like corporations, believe that it does 
have some effect. Therefore, because they believe that it has an effect, 
corporations, political parties and government feel they need to manage their own 
appearance in order to gain acclamation of the audience by casting themselves in a 
positive light. This interpretation of Habermas is central to this thesis. That is, it is 
not, as some critics would argue, Habermas' s intention to label the audience as 
incapable of resisting the outside influences of powerful actors. It is the processes 
involved in seeking public acclamation and the quality of information emanating 
from these processes that produces news media that is inconsistent. It is this 
constant barrage of information lacking in consistency or veracity entering the 
public sphere that contributes to a public's lack of confidence in their own opinions 
and a disengagement with politics altogether. As a result, this chain of events 
ostensibly arrests and impoverishes public debate on government dealings, and 
obscures important debates that potentially define a nation's moral integrity in a 
global setting. 
We may conclude by noting that these interactions and integrations are happening 
as a predictable result of an amalgamation between capitalism, the news media and 
politics. After all, if we invest our faith in a system that values profit as an end in 
itself, where the corporate news media and politicians advocate and actively 
encourage distinctions between winners and losers, the conditions under which the 
channels of communication operate will continue to be severely compromised. 
56 
APPENDICES 
Appendix: A 
The McQuillan Report: A different way of covering daily television news 
[Full transcript can be found at: 
http:/ /www.abc.net.au/sydney/stories/s 1229586.htm] 
I. There is little consistency in each network's ability to provide 'exclusive' 
Australian stories to lead the network bulletin, or to have an exclusive 
story good enough to place in the top four stories. 
2. Each network covers the main story of the day in strikingly similar 
ways, often using the same talent and similar vision; 
3. There is little variance in the coverage of a network story in terms of 
story ideas, angles, vision or grabs; 
4. The vision and talent are usually set up for the reporters/crews and 
producers by way of media conferences and/or doorstops. While this 
reflects and accommodates the pressures that each 
reporter/crew/producer face in getting a story to air, it also ensure that 
the main points which talent want to get across do actually get across. 
There is little or no independent analysis of, for example, new political 
policy analysis and thus the media conference is the focus of the story: 
5. There is questionable value in the current system of each network 
sending a reporter and crew to the same event for what will inevitably 
be the same story; 
6. That the element of competition is by and large failing to produce 
significantly different news programmes 
The networks need to consider: 
• Why many bulletins are similar to the opposition bulletins, in both 
perceptions of story importance (selection), angles and content; 
• That in the cities where the networks are locked in fierce competition, 
the populations are significantly high enough to provide stories that 
reflect the breadth and depth of people and events that make up the 
approximately eight million people; 
• That by pooling resources on what the network news executives 
consider to the main common stories of the day, each network would 
have more resources to provide a greater variety and depth to the news 
stories for their audiences; 
• That by pooling resources to help create for what are considered the 
main common stories of the day, the networks would be able to explore 
57 
exclusive stories to cater for the demands of different demographics, 
including the demographic that researchers say are declining TV news 
viewers, i.e. the 16-25 year olds. 
Summary of Findings: 
1. An analysis of the breakdown of the main stories covered in this limited 
snapshot of nightly news coverage in Sydney and Melbourne reveals: 
2. There are few differences in the networks' perceptions of the important 
stories of the day; 
3. Most networks run the same or similar stories in their bulletins, often 
using the same/similar grabs from the same/similar talent, sourced from 
the same media conference or doorstop; 
4. Each network runs only one, perhaps two stories, that are not run on 
another network but this is not a consistent pattern; 
5. It should be noted that while this survey compared the local content of 
Channels 2, 7, 9 and 10, a point of difference between the commercial 
networks and the ABC was the ABC's more comprehensive international 
coverage. 
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Appendix: B 
Audio transcript: 'Strengthening Medicare' advertisement. (Strengthening 
Medicare, 2004 ). 
***START*** 
Q: What's this about the new Medicare safety net? 
A: It's one of the ways we're strengthening Medicare. 
While Medicare has always covered you in public hospital, the new Safety Net 
protects you against high medical costs when you haven't been admitted to hospital. 
Q: Like what I pay to my GP? 
A: Yes, the costs for a whole range of treatments - like specialists, x-rays, tests, scans ... 
Q: But we already get a Medicare rebate on those. 
A: And that will continue 
But often you need to pay a gap, and that's where this helps. 
Q: So how does it work? 
A: Now, once your extra costs reach a certain level, Medicare will pay eighty per cent of 
that gap for the rest of the year. 
Q: Sound good - but when does it kick in? 
A: For most families with children and concession card holders, the level is $300 a year. 
For everyone else - $700. 
Q: Is that $300 each 
A: No, for couples it's for both of you. And for families it includes all of you. 
Q: That should be a help. 
A: The New Safety Net. It's just one of the ways we're strengthening Medicare. 
A: To find out more, watch out for this booklet. 
***END** 
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Appendix C: Timor Sea Justice Campaign 
Friday 25th of March, 2005 - For immediate release. 
SBS AND SEVEN PULL TIMOR SEA ADS 
Channel 7 and SBS have announced that they will not be screening the latest television 
commercials about the Timor Sea dispute written and funded by Australian businessperson 
Ian Melrose. 
The two advertisements were to be screened over the Easter Break to mark the anniversary of 
the Australian Government's withdrawal of recognition of the maritime boundary jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice. 
The ads accuse the Australian Government of stealing $2 billion from East Timor and claim 
that "stealing from a third world country kills their children". 
The networks have not yet supplied written statements outlining the reasons why they will not 
screen the ads, but have indicated that there were concerned about the content of the ads for 
young viewers. But Ian Melrose dismisses that argument claiming, "The ads have already 
been approved by the appropriate bodies and were deemed suitable for free to air television, 
so that can't be the reason." 
"What I want to know is, have the networks received any directives or suggestions from the 
Australian Government? What's changed since the last ads were screened?" asked Mr 
Melrose, who was motivated to run the advertising campaign after reading about the death of 
a 12 year old East Timorese girl from worm infestation. A 20 cent tablet could have helped 
prevent her death. 
Tom Clarke from the Timor Sea Justice Campaign Melbourne, claims it can not be the figures 
that the networks object to as the $2 billion is a conservative figure based on publicly 
accessible financial reports published by Woodside Petroleum. 
''The figures are accurate and stealing simply means taking something that is not yours, so I 
don't see what grounds the networks would have for not screening these ads." said Mr Clarke. 
The $2 billion worth of royalties the Australian Government has taken, come from the 
Laminaria Corallina fields alone. These fields are outside of the Joint Petroleum Development 
Area, but are likely to belong to East Timor if maritime boundaries are set in accordance with 
current principles oflnternational Law. 
The Timor Sea Justice Campaign also backs Mr Melrose's emotive claim that 'stealing from a 
third world nation kills children'. Tom Clarke claims, "There is a direct link between the high 
number of preventable deaths in East Timor and the drastic lack of funds to establish a 
working health system, run de-worming programs, the provision of clean water and so on. 
The Australian Government is taking billions of dollars from the poorest nation in Asia, of 
course that's having a direct and sometimes fatal impact on East Timorese children." 
Officials from SBS and Channel 7 were unavailable for comment today due to the Easter 
public holiday. 
Mr Melrose will continue his advertising campaign to raise awareness of the Timor Sea 
dispute, saying his next focus will be the Australian Government's betrayal of the ANZAC 
spirit. 
The advertisements can be viewed online at: http://www.timorseajustice.org/tvcs.htmFor further 
information please contact: Tom Clarke, Co-ordinator, Timor Sea Justice Campaign, Melbourne. 0422 
545 763 tom@timorseajustice.org 
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